

May 2, 2011

Ms. Jennifer J. Johnson
Secretary
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
20th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20551

Ms. Cynthia Ayouch
Acting Federal Reserve Board Clearance Officer
Division of Research and Statistics, Mail Stop 95-A
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551

**Re: Docket No. R-1406, RIN No. 7100-AD 65
Truth in Lending 12 CFR Part 226**

Dear Ms. Johnson and Ms. Ayouch:

American Bankers Association (ABA) welcomes the opportunity to provide comments on the Board's proposal regarding mandatory escrow and disclosures on higher priced mortgage loans (HPMLs), amending Regulation Z, as published in the Federal Register, Vol. 76, No. 41, on Wednesday, March 2, 2011. The American Bankers Association represents banks of all sizes and charters and is the voice for the nation's \$13 trillion banking industry and its two million employees. ABA's extensive resources enhance the success of the nation's banks and strengthen America's economy and communities.

The comments submitted by ABA are substantially similar to those provided jointly by the Consumer Mortgage Coalition (CMC), the American Financial Services Association (AFSA), and the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA). ABA has additional singular comments, however, and we therefore submit separate comments.

I. Summary

The proposed rule implements sections 1461 and 1462¹ of the Dodd-Frank Act that govern escrow accounts, requiring escrow or impound accounts for certain consumer credit transactions and imposing various new disclosure requirements. As we have noted in previous comments to

¹ Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1461 and 1462, at 124 Stat. 2178-82.

the Board, Section 1461 is an extremely difficult provision that sets forth a very confusing framework for when escrows must be required and when they may be permitted. In this sense, the proposal provides helpful clarifications of when escrows are actually mandated. The rule would implement a helpful consumer protection by exempting from mandatory escrows insurance premiums for planned unit developments and condominiums, where the homeowner does not pay for insurance directly. The proposed rule would also provide an exemption for small creditors, and various other exemptions set forth in the Act.

ABA has strong reservations with various other aspects of this rulemaking. Portions of this proposal would impose very heavy disclosure requirements that exceed the requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act, and may exceed existing statutory authority. In our comments below, we suggest numerous clarifications and refinements in this regard, and explain that our requests stem from deepening concerns about the extreme burdens that arise from an increasingly disorderly regulatory implementation process.

The proposed rule would also create a novel regulatory term called “transaction coverage rate.” As provided in previous proposed rulemaking, though not adopted, the transaction coverage rate would have effects beyond escrows, and would significantly affect regulatory spheres that are entirely outside of the Dodd-Frank Act. In our comments below, we describe our concerns with the timing and implementation of these aspects of the proposed rule.

The ABA also joins CMC, AFSA, and MBA—our partner trade associations representing other segments of the financial services industry—in expressing broader structural concerns with this rulemaking. The industry notes that there is currently in place a comprehensive set of escrow disclosures under Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) rules. The Board’s proposed rule is not accompanied by a Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) proposal to remove those RESPA disclosures when the Board’s proposal becomes final. That means the RESPA disclosures would remain in place, while Truth in Lending Act (TILA) rules would add yet another layer of nearly-duplicative disclosures. The Board does not explain why it proposes to require duplicative disclosures. It does not suggest, for example, that there is a flaw in the existing RESPA disclosures that leaves consumers at risk.

If the Board were to finalize this rule, these duplicative disclosures may be in place for only a short time. Consumer mortgage disclosures are, right now, in the process of being entirely redesigned. Congress mandated in the Dodd-Frank Act that the RESPA and TILA disclosures be integrated. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has made that project an early priority, and has begun even before the CFPB is fully operational. It is likely, therefore, that the CFPB will have integrated disclosures proposed and in place soon. All RESPA and TILA mortgage disclosures must be integrated, meaning escrow disclosures will be integrated.² As a

² “The Bureau shall publish a single, integrated disclosure for mortgage loan transactions (including real estate settlement cost statements) which includes the disclosure requirements of this title [TILA] in conjunction with the disclosure requirements of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 that, taken together, may apply to a transaction that is subject to both or either provisions of law. The purpose of such model disclosure shall be to facilitate compliance with the disclosure requirements of this title and the

result, this rulemaking would require implementation of an entirely new set of duplicative escrow disclosures, and a short time later, when the disclosures are integrated, the industry would be required to replace at least part of the duplicative disclosures with integrated escrow disclosures.

We do not yet know which part of the redundant disclosures the CFPB will remove, which it will retain, or whether it will replace both with entirely new disclosures. It is possible that the CFPB will adopt escrow disclosures exactly as the Board now proposes and repeal every overlapping RESPA disclosure, but that is mere conjecture. Even if we fully supported the proposed disclosures, we cannot support implementing costly systems changes based on conjecture that the systems changes might not need to be replaced soon.

The transaction coverage rate in the proposed escrow rule would replace the annual percentage rate (APR) in a comparison to the annual average prime offer rater (APOR). The proposed rule would use this comparison to define higher-priced mortgage loans (HPMLs) on which escrows would be required. However, the Dodd-Frank Act requires APR-to-APOR comparisons in areas unrelated to escrows, as we describe below. It would be inappropriate to revise the definition used for this comparison in a rulemaking specific to escrow accounts. All the purposes for which it will be used should be implemented consistently and together to minimize overlapping rulemakings that will require immense effort to conform and correct. Note, for instance, that the proposal leaves unclear how the transaction coverage rate will be utilized for calculating higher-priced mortgage loans when a creditor finances either the temporary or permanent phase of construction or both. Considering only the escrow uses of that comparison may increase the likelihood that the CFPB will revise the definition as it considers the non-escrow aspects of the comparisons, meaning that creditors would soon have to remove and restart its implementation, at great expense.

Our comments above should not be interpreted as broad disagreements with the substance of the Board's proposals. However, we do object to being required to provide duplicative consumer disclosures because they will overburden consumers with yet more papers to manage and to understand. Even when the content of the disclosures is clear, *the volume of consumer mortgage disclosures today is a serious impediment to consumer understanding.*

We also object to having to implement changes that require very significant implementation resources, when later creditors nationwide would need to remove and replace that implementation, at additional significant cost, and begin implementation of a new set of requirements. This would impose unnecessary regulatory burden.

ABA further agrees with the other major financial trade associations that the Board has not adequately considered this unnecessary regulatory burden as required under either the Paperwork

Reduction Act or the Regulatory Flexibility Act. Both of those laws are designed to prevent unnecessary regulatory burdens such as some of the burdens this rulemaking would impose. We set out our Paperwork Reduction Act and Regulatory Flexibility Act positions in an Appendix to this letter because of their length, and incorporate them herein by reference. The legal analysis provided in this appendix matches the analysis submitted in the joint comments submitted by CAM, AFSA, and MBA.

We very strongly urge the Board, for the short time before integrated disclosures are in place, to deem delivery of escrow disclosures under RESPA rules to be compliant with TILA. We also suggest that the Board not require implementation of the transaction coverage rate, again, for the short time until an integrated definition is in place. This approach would very substantially reduce regulatory burden without significantly affecting consumers.

At minimum, ABA believes the Board should work with the CFPB to create a timeline for present and future regulatory change imposed under the Dodd Frank Act that would assure lenders that these expensive alterations will be properly integrated into future reforms. Banks are extremely disturbed, however, that these and other regulatory proposals are not following any pre-established order or long-term regulatory agenda that at minimum assures financial institutions that the unremitting changes will eventually lead to a proper consolidation or integration of the basic legal requirements necessary to lend. The agencies have thus far not made public any consideration of long-term agency planning to orderly implement the slew of regulatory changes that will impact industry operations. In the current environment, lenders cannot properly project the immense operational costs that will result from these constant changes. This is especially true for small community banks. The brunt of these rising costs arise from unplanned and unremitting system changes—not necessarily from the substance of these changes. A proactive understanding of the order of changes to come would go a very long way in allowing institutions the ability to properly plan forward.

II. New Mortgage Disclosures Should Await Integration

In the most fundamental request of these comments on the proposed escrow rules, ABA joins the CMS, AFSA, and MBA in asking that this rulemaking be postponed until a later point where all the Dodd-Frank Act reforms can be properly considered and accurately integrated.

Consumer mortgage disclosures have been confusing for far too long, and there are far too many of them. ABA has long advocated that there is urgent need for simplification of the forms and disclosures applicable to mortgage loans. Consumers need streamlined and clearer disclosures, while lenders recognize that regulatory simplicity is essential to achieving a more streamlined and understandable legal foundation for proper implementation. Despite the best of intentions, the current disclosure regime confuses consumers rather than help them make informed decisions about which loan products are best for them. They also confuse even the most experienced legal experts, and give rise to unwarranted legal risk.

Our membership is therefore fully supportive of the Dodd-Frank Act's mandate that the RESPA and TILA disclosures be integrated and that consumers receive a single disclosure form rather than the stack of confusing forms consumers receive today. To make certain integration happens, Congress required that integration in, not one, but three places in the Dodd-Frank Act.³

Nowhere in the proposed rule, however, does the Board address the Congressional mandate that disclosures be integrated. Nor does the Board address how this rulemaking will affect the integration process, or whether the implementation team at the CFPB concurs with this proposal. The CFPB has already begun the integration process and has made it a high priority.

The triple mandate is in Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act, which does not become effective until the designated transfer date. It is therefore possible that the Board believes it needs to proceed with the proposed escrow rule before then. However, his view ignores the need for consumer protection, is contrary to the substance of statutory triple mandate, and ignores the schedule Congress established.

The substance of the triple mandate is that the disclosures need to be integrated because consumers need to be protected. We believe this is an important goal, and there is no reason to delay integration.

Further, the statutory language makes clear that Congress intended integration to begin before the designated transfer date. Congress requires the CFPB to propose an integrated disclosure form by a date certain, "unless the Bureau determines that any proposal issued by the Board of Governors and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development carries out the same purpose."⁴ The Board and HUD can only propose an integrated disclosure if they do so before the designated transfer date, when their relevant rulewriting authority transfers to the CFPB. That is, *Congress clearly intended integration to begin before the designated transfer date.*

Moreover, the present rulemaking would implement a provision in Title XIV. Congress does not require Title XIV regulations, with one irrelevant exception, until 18 months after the designated transfer date.⁵ To argue that the present rulemaking can proceed now because the triple mandate does not yet matter would reverse the timing Congress established. Congress intended that integration work begin right away, before the designated transfer date. Congress did not intend that Title XIV rulemakings be done so quickly. Proceeding with a Title XIV rulemaking that makes the disclosures *less* integrated while not working on integrating the rules is the opposite of what Congress intended in enacting the Dodd-Frank Act.

³ The Dodd-Frank Act requires integration in each § 1032(f), § 1098(2)(A), as well as in § 1100A(5). 124 Stat. at 2007, 2103-04, and 2108.

⁴ Dodd-Frank Act § 1032(f), 124 Stat. at 2007.

⁵ Dodd-Frank Act § 1400(c), 124 Stat. at 2136.

The Board does not discuss the RESPA escrow disclosures and describe some flaw in them that the Board must fix or that it has unsuccessfully tried to persuade HUD to fix. The Board does not propose to integrate its proposed escrow disclosures with HUD's escrow disclosures.

We believe that requiring new mortgage disclosures that are not integrated is no longer within the Board's authority because *Congress enacted the triple mandate*.

Congress was also very clear that the new disclosure should be "a single, integrated disclosure"⁶ rather than multiple disclosures. The proposed rule would require another redundant layer of disclosures, on yet another piece of paper, even though *Congress mandated an end to redundant, overlapping disclosures*.

III. The Proposed Disclosures Duplicate Existing Disclosures

The Board describes in many places that the disclosures it requires are "necessary[.]" It does not mention the possibility that existing disclosures are sufficient. RESPA and its implementing Regulation X currently require escrow disclosures that are clear, detailed, and understandable.

We spend several pages below illustrating the RESPA disclosures to demonstrate how duplicative the Board's proposed disclosures are. We do not discuss which aspect of RESPA or TILA disclosures is better or worse because neither will be in place a few months hence. Rather, we emphasize the similarity of the substance of both sets of disclosures. *That similarity makes the enormous regulatory burden of implementing new duplicative disclosures for a short time, and the burden of soon removing them, quite inappropriate*.

Lenders must provide consumers with HUD's Settlement Costs Booklet.⁷ It is easy for consumers to understand and has, for example, a clear table of contents. It clearly explains escrow accounts. For example, it states:

Taxes and Insurance: In addition to the principal and interest portion of your mortgage payment, you will have to pay property taxes and insurance to protect the property in the event of disaster such as a fire or flood. Based on your down payment, you may also have to pay mortgage insurance. Your lender may require an escrow or impound account to pay these items with your monthly mortgage payment. If an escrow account is not required,

⁶ The Dodd-Frank Act requires "a single, integrated disclosure" in each § 1032(f), § 1098(2)(A), as well as in § 1100A(5); 124 Stat. at 2007, 2103-04, and 2108.

⁷ RESPA § 5(d). We recommend that the CFPB transform the HUD Settlement Booklet so that the information is presented in an interactive, visual manner, and that the CFPB distribute it over the Internet for free where consumers will find it. We believe this educational information should be readily available *long before* a consumer approaches a lender about getting a mortgage loan because the information would be more effective were consumers to receive it before filing a loan application.

you are responsible for making these payments.

Mortgage insurance may be required by your lender if your down payment is less than 20% of the purchase price. Mortgage insurance protects the lender if you default on your loan. You may be able to cancel mortgage insurance in the future based on certain criteria, such as paying down your loan balance to a certain amount. Before you commit to paying for mortgage insurance, find out the specific requirements for cancellation. Mortgage insurance should not be confused with mortgage life, credit life, or disability insurance that are designed to pay off a mortgage in the event of a borrower's death or disability. Your *Good Faith Estimate* should not have any charges for mortgage life, credit life, or disability insurance.

Homeowner's (hazard) insurance protects your property in the event of a loss such as fire. Many lenders require that you get a homeowner's policy before settlement.

Flood insurance will be required if the house is in a flood hazard area. After your loan is settled, if a change in flood insurance maps brings your home within a flood hazard area, your lender or servicer may require you to buy flood insurance at that time.

RESPA good faith estimates (GFEs) disclose, on page 1, the following:

Some lenders require an escrow account to hold funds for paying property taxes or other property-related charges in addition to your monthly amount owed of \$.
Do we require you to have an escrow account for your loan?

No, you do not have an escrow account. You must pay these charges directly when due.
 Yes, you have an escrow account. It may or may not cover all of these charges. Ask us.

HUD's booklet explains this disclosure:

Escrow Account Information

Some lenders require an escrow account to hold funds for paying property taxes or other property-related charges in addition to your monthly amount owed of \$ 1,173.00 .
Do we require you to have an escrow account for your loan?

No, you do not have an escrow account. You must pay these charges directly when due.
 Yes, you have an escrow account. It may or may not cover all of these charges. Ask us.

The GFE also includes a separate section referred to as "Escrow account information," which indicates whether or not an escrow account is required. This account holds funds needed to pay property taxes, homeowner's insurance, flood insurance (if required by your lender) or other property-related charges.

If the GFE specifies that you will have an escrow account, you will probably have to pay an initial amount at settlement to start the account and an additional amount with each month's regular payment. If you wish to pay your property taxes and insurance directly,

some lenders will give you a higher interest rate or charge you a fee. **If your lender does not require an escrow account, you must pay these items directly when they are due.**

On page 2, the GFE discloses the following:

9. Initial deposit for your escrow account This charge is held in an escrow account to pay future recurring charges on your property and includes <input type="checkbox"/> all property taxes, <input type="checkbox"/> all insurance, and <input type="checkbox"/> other _____ .	
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and:

11. Homeowner's insurance This charge is for the insurance you must buy for the property to protect from a loss, such as fire. <table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="text-align: left; border-bottom: 1px solid black;"><i>Policy</i></th> <th style="text-align: left; border-bottom: 1px solid black;"><i>Charge</i></th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td style="border-bottom: 1px solid black;"> </td> <td style="border-bottom: 1px solid black;"> </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border-bottom: 1px solid black;"> </td> <td style="border-bottom: 1px solid black;"> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	<i>Policy</i>	<i>Charge</i>					
<i>Policy</i>	<i>Charge</i>						

HUD's Booklet also explains these GFE disclosures:

Block 9 contains the initial amount you will pay at settlement to start the escrow account, if required by the lender. . . .

Block 11 contains the annual charge for any insurance the lender requires to protect the property such as homeowner's insurance and flood insurance.

The HUD-1 settlement statement requires the following disclosures:

900. Items Required by Lender to Be Paid in Advance						
901. Daily interest charges from	to	@ \$	/day	(from GFE #10)		
902. Mortgage insurance premium	for	months to		(from GFE #3)		
903. Homeowner's insurance	for	years to		(from GFE #11)		
904.						
1000. Reserves Deposited with Lender						
1001. Initial deposit for your escrow account				(from GFE #9)		
1002. Homeowner's Insurance	months @ \$		per month	\$		
1003. Mortgage Insurance	months @ \$		per month	\$		
1004. Property taxes	months @ \$		per month	\$		
1005.	months @ \$		per month	\$		
1006.	months @ \$		per month	\$		
1007. Aggregate Adjustment				-\$		

The Booklet explains these disclosures clearly:

900 Series, Items Required by Lender to be Paid in Advance

900. Items Required by Lender to be Paid in Advance			
901. Daily interest charges from 1/31/2010 to 2/1/2010 @ \$ 28.00 /day		(from GFE #10)	\$28.00
902. Mortgage insurance premium for _____ months to _____		(from GFE #3)	
903. Homeowner's insurance for 1 years to Insure-It (\$600 P.O.C. by borrower)		(from GFE #11)	

These are charges which the lender requires to be prepaid at settlement.

Line 901 lists the daily interest charges collected for the period between the date of your settlement and the first day of the next month. This charge is disclosed in Block 10 of your GFE. In this example, the loan closed on 1/31/10, and the interest on the GFE was calculated with a 1/31/10 closing date so the charges are the same on both. This amount on Line 901 may differ from the amount on the GFE if the settlement date changes.

Line 902 lists the charge for any up-front mortgage insurance premium payment due at settlement. This is one of the charges disclosed in GFE Block 3 of your GFE. In this example, there is no payment due.

Line 903 is the charge for the homeowner's insurance policy and is one of the charges disclosed in Block 11 of your GFE. In the example, the homeowner's insurance was paid prior to the day of settlement so the charge is listed as "P.O.C. by borrower". P.O.C. stands for "Paid Outside of Closing". You typically have to bring a pre-paid insurance policy to your settlement.

1000 Series, Reserves Deposited with Lender

1000. Reserves Deposited with Lender			
1001. Initial deposit for your escrow account		(from GFE #9)	\$350.00
1002. Homeowner's insurance 1 months @ \$ 50.00 per month \$ 50.00			
1003. Mortgage insurance 1 months @ \$ 100.00 per month \$ 100.00			
1004. Property Taxes 2 months @ \$ 200.00 per month \$ 400.00			
1005. _____ months @ \$ _____ per month \$ _____			
1006. _____ months @ \$ _____ per month \$ _____			
1007. Aggregate Adjustment			-\$ 200.00

This series of the HUD-1 lists the amounts collected by the lender to be placed in your escrow account for future payments of items such as homeowner's insurance, mortgage insurance and property taxes. Line 1007 is an adjustment to make sure lenders are only collecting the maximum amount allowed by law. In this example, even though the first year's homeowner's insurance premium has already been paid, the lender has started escrowing money to pay the next bill.

When establishing an escrow account, the servicer or lender must conduct an escrow analysis to determine the amount of the initial deposit.⁸ An escrow account statement must be delivered within 45 days of establishing an escrow.⁹ This statement must show the amount of the monthly payment, the portion of the payment going into the escrow account, the estimated taxes, insurance, and other charges to be paid from the escrow, and the anticipated disbursement dates.¹⁰ It must state the amount of the escrow cushion.¹¹ It must identify the payees or what the disbursements are for.¹² It must also include a trial running balance.¹³

A permissible format for the initial escrow disclosure is as follows:¹⁴

⁸ 24 C.F.R. § 3500.17(g)(1).

⁹ 24 C.F.R. §§ 3500.17(g)(1) (within 45 days of settlement if an escrow is established at settlement); 3500.17(g)(2) (within 45 days after escrow is established after settlement and not as a loan condition).

¹⁰ 24 C.F.R. § 3500.17(g)(1)(i).

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² 24 C.F.R. § 3500.17(h)(3).

¹³ 24 C.F.R. § 3500.17(g)(1).

¹⁴ 60 Fed. Reg. 24734, 24736 (May 9, 1995). HUD removed this form from codification in an effort to streamline its regulations, but preserves the material and makes it available as public guidance. 61 Fed. Reg. 13232 (March 26, 1996).

**APPENDIX G-1: INITIAL ESCROW ACCOUNT DISCLOSURE STATEMENT —
 FORMAT**

[Servicer's name, address, and toll-free number.]

INITIAL ESCROW ACCOUNT DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

THIS IS AN ESTIMATE OF ACTIVITY IN YOUR ESCROW ACCOUNT DURING THE COMING YEAR
 BASED ON PAYMENTS ANTICIPATED TO BE MADE FROM YOUR ACCOUNT.

Month	Payments to Escrow Account	Payments from Escrow Account	Description	Escrow Account Balance
Initial deposit:				\$ _____

[A filled-out format follows.]

(PLEASE KEEP THIS STATEMENT FOR COMPARISON WITH THE ACTUAL ACTIVITY IN YOUR
 ACCOUNT AT THE END OF THE ESCROW ACCOUNTING COMPUTATION YEAR.)

Cushion selected by servicer: \$ _____.

YOUR MONTHLY MORTGAGE PAYMENT FOR THE COMING YEAR WILL BE \$ _____, OF
 WHICH \$ _____ WILL BE FOR PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST, \$ _____ WILL GO INTO YOUR
 ESCROW ACCOUNT, AND \$ _____ WILL BE FOR DISCRETIONARY ITEMS (SUCH AS LIFE
 INSURANCE, DISABILITY INSURANCE) THAT YOU CHOSE TO BE INCLUDED WITH YOUR MONTHLY
 PAYMENT.]

[YOUR FIRST MONTHLY MORTGAGE PAYMENT FOR THE COMING YEAR WILL BE \$ _____, OF
 WHICH \$ _____ WILL BE FOR PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST, \$ _____ WILL GO INTO YOUR
 ESCROW ACCOUNT, AND \$ _____ WILL BE FOR DISCRETIONARY ITEMS (SUCH AS LIFE
 INSURANCE, DISABILITY INSURANCE) THAT YOU CHOSE TO BE INCLUDED WITH YOUR MONTHLY
 PAYMENT. THE TERMS OF YOUR LOAN MAY RESULT IN CHANGES TO THE MONTHLY PRINCIPAL
 AND INTEREST PAYMENTS DURING THE YEAR.]

[INSTRUCTIONS TO PREPARER: The servicer is to use the appropriate option above describing the
 principal and interest payments for the coming year. The reference to payments for discretionary items
 should be omitted if there are no such payments included with the monthly payment. This instruction
 paragraph should not appear on the form.]

The Settlement Costs Booklet also explains the initial and annual escrow account disclosures:

If your loan requires an escrow account, the servicer of your loan must give you an initial escrow account statement at your settlement or within the following forty-five (45) days. That form will show all of the payments which are expected to be deposited into your escrow account and all of the disbursements which are expected to be paid from the escrow account during the year. Your servicer will review your escrow account annually and send you a disclosure each year which shows the prior year's activity and any adjustments necessary in the escrow payments that need to be made in the upcoming year. You will not receive this yearly disclosure if your loan is in default. Remember that your monthly payment can increase if your taxes or insurance payments increase.

Additionally, HUD has published informative “FAQs About Escrow Accounts for Consumers.”¹⁵ These FAQs describe topics such as escrow cushions, how escrow payments vary, and how to calculate how much the lender may require in an escrow account.

In its consumer testing for the present rulemaking, the Board tested only its own forms, not HUD’s forms, and did not provide the consumers it interviewed with the RESPA escrow disclosures. The Board did not explain its decision to selectively test only some forms. The integrated approach would have been to test both sets of disclosures together – in a “real world” loan environment – so the regulators could select the best of each and drop the worst of both.

The RESPA escrow disclosures work well. However, they are not integrated with the Board’s proposed disclosures, and are not integrated with the Dodd-Frank Act changes to escrow requirements. Doubling the disclosures is not integrating them. It would not inform consumers, it would overload them.

The Dodd-Frank Act requires disclosures to be integrated quickly. It does not require new § 1461 escrow disclosures to be implemented until 18 months after the designated transfer date. The proposed disclosures are very substantially duplicative of RESPA escrow disclosures, while the Dodd-Frank Act triple mandate requires integrated, not duplicative, disclosures. Additionally, some of the proposed disclosures are not required by the Dodd-Frank Act at all.¹⁶ The regulatory burden of implementing a new disclosure regime for an extremely short period, and then of undoing that implementation and replacing it with something new would be enormous. For all of these reasons, the Board should not adopt any new consumer mortgage disclosures, and should instead defer to the CFPB’s integration project. In the brief interim, the Board should make clear that RESPA disclosures comply with TILA.

IV. The Proposal is Inconsistent With Recent Board Announcement

We very much appreciated the announcement the Board made on February 1, 2011:

[T]he Board has carefully evaluated whether there would be public benefit in proceeding with the rulemakings initiated with the Board’s August 2009 and September 2010 proposals at this time. Because the Board’s 2009 and 2010 TILA proposals would substantially revise the disclosures for mortgage transactions, any new disclosures

¹⁵ The FAQs are here:

<http://web.archive.org/web/20070403030842/http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/res/respafaq.cfm>

¹⁶ Proposed § 226.19(f) would require disclosures about escrows for all loans secured by first liens on a real property or dwelling. The Dodd-Frank Act requires disclosures only when an escrow is required, not when an escrow is voluntary, and not when there is no escrow established. Proposed § 226.20(d) would further require a disclosure when an escrow will be cancelled. The Dodd-Frank Act does not require cancellation notices.

adopted by the Board would be subject to the CFPB's further revision in carrying out its mandate to combine the TILA and RESPA disclosures. In addition, a combined TILA-RESPA disclosure rule could well be proposed by the CFPB before any new disclosure requirements issued by the Board could be fully implemented. For these reasons, the Board has determined that proceeding with the 2009 and 2010 proposals would not be in the public interest. Although there are specific provisions of these Board proposals that would not be affected by the CFPB's development of joint TILA-RESPA disclosures, adopting those portions of the Board's proposals in a piecemeal fashion would be of limited benefit, and the issuance of multiple rules with different implementation periods would create compliance difficulties.

This announcement came the day after an interim final rule¹⁷ began requiring a new disclosure that is both divergent from and redundant of RESPA disclosures. The Board in December published a revision to that rule, also in the form of an interim final rule. Both of these rules arise from the Board's 2009 TILA proposal. The Board is adopting rules in piecemeal fashion with different implementation periods, which is making compliance extremely difficult.

We appreciate the Board's position against piecemeal rulemakings. In the same spirit, the new disclosures required by the present rulemaking should await integration.

V. The Board's Assertion of Authority for Duplicative Disclosures is Inconsistent With the Integration Mandate

The Board relies on three legal bases for the present rulemaking, including TILA § 105(a). Congress enacted that authority in 1968, and it is indeed broad. Until the designated transfer date, it will read:

The Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this subchapter. Except in the case of a mortgage referred to in section 103(aa), these regulations may contain such classifications, differentiations, or other provisions, and may provide for such adjustments and exceptions for any class of transactions, as in the judgment of the Board are necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of this subchapter, to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance therewith.

The exception for § 103(aa) mortgage loans was enacted in 1994, and this language was designated as a subsection in 1980. Other than those changes, this authority to require disclosures existed from 1968 until the 2010 triple mandate.

The Board asserts in its proposal that the following duplicative disclosures are "necessary":

¹⁷ 75 Fed. Reg. 58470 (September 24, 2010). This interim final rule requires a new interest rate and payment summary disclosure. Compliance with it became mandatory January 30, 2011.

- Preconsummation disclosure of what an escrow is and how it works.¹⁸
- Whether a mortgage loan will have an escrow, and the implications of not having one.¹⁹
- The amount required to fund the escrow at consummation.²⁰
- The amount of the periodic payments that will go into the escrow.²¹
- Mortgage payments can change with changes in property tax or hazard insurance costs.²²
- Other names for an escrow account.²³
- A telephone number that the consumer can call to request an escrow account, or to request that it not be closed, and the date by which the consumer must make the request.²⁴
- An existing escrow is being closed and the risk of not having an escrow.²⁵
- Why an escrow is being closed.²⁶
- A number to call to request that an escrow that is closing be retained if the creditor offers that option.²⁷

¹⁸ 76 Fed. Reg. 11598, 11602 (March 2, 2011).

¹⁹ 76 Fed. Reg. 11598, 11602 (March 2, 2011).

²⁰ 76 Fed. Reg. 11598, 11602 (March 2, 2011).

²¹ 76 Fed. Reg. 11598, 11602 (March 2, 2011).

²² 76 Fed. Reg. 11598, 11602 (March 2, 2011).

²³ 76 Fed. Reg. 11598, 11602 (March 2, 2011).

²⁴ 76 Fed. Reg. 11598 at 11603 and 11607 (March 2, 2011).

²⁵ 76 Fed. Reg. 11598, 11607 (March 2, 2011).

²⁶ 76 Fed. Reg. 11598, 11607 (March 2, 2011).

²⁷ 76 Fed. Reg. 11598, 11607 (March 2, 2011).

Escrow accounts have existed longer than TILA, and they have not changed significantly since 1976 when RESPA permitted escrow cushions. If the duplicative disclosures the Board proposes were necessary, the Board would have required them in 1968 under its broad § 105(a) authority. The fact that it did not do so firmly establishes that the duplicative disclosures are unnecessary, and that the RESPA escrow disclosures are sufficient. The Board's several assertions of authority for the proposed disclosures, that duplicative disclosures are "necessary[.]" are not consistent with the statutory requirement that disclosures be integrated and not duplicative.

The reason the Board has never before found escrow disclosures under TILA are necessary is that a different agency has a well-developed, long-tested, complete set of disclosures. There are many state disclosures in place as well. HUD and state disclosures are still in place, so additional Regulation Z disclosure requirements would merely be duplicative.

It is true that the Dodd-Frank Act revised the *form* of escrow disclosures, primarily by requiring that they be integrated. The law does not require new *substantive* disclosures beyond what is already required by RESPA rules. The reason Congress put the revisions in TILA rather than in RESPA, as it did most of Title XIV, was to increase the application of TILA statutory damages, not to permit the Board to be out of compliance with the triple mandate.

VI. Expanded Definitions of Dwelling and Real Property

The Board would expand the definition for the terms dwelling and real property for application of the escrow rules.²⁸ The Board does not make clear that the expanded definitions apply only to the new disclosure provisions and not the mandatory escrow rules. The Dodd-Frank Act would make the disclosures applicable to mandatory escrow and to instances where consumers waive escrow services. The Board proposes to expand disclosure coverage to include voluntary escrow accounts as well.²⁹ The ABA would ask the Board to refrain from broadening existing definitions as it applies these new disclosures requirements upon mandatory and non-mandatory escrows.

In the proposal's clarified definition of dwelling, vacation and second homes and mobile homes, boats, and trailers used as residences would be included. In that the proposed rule is specific to residential mortgage transactions related to principal residences, the requirements of escrow should apply only to those transaction that meet the definition of Residential Mortgage Transaction under TILA, 226.2 (a)(24). Section 226.2 (a)(24) reads:

Residential mortgage transaction means a transaction in which a mortgage, deed or trust, purchase money security interest arising under an installment sales contract, or

²⁸ See Proposed Rule Section by Section Analysis, 76 Fed. Reg. 1598, 11600.

²⁹ Dodd-Frank Act § 1461, § 129D(h); See also Section by Section Analysis, 76 Fed. Reg. 1598, 11600.

equivalent consensual security interest is created or retained in the consumer's principal dwelling to finance the acquisition or initial construction of that dwelling.

Under a plain reading of the Dodd-Frank Act, the new disclosure rules should only apply to transactions involving the principal dwelling of the consumer. This interpretation is in concert with section 1461 of the Act (section 129D(a)) which requires an escrow account on the “principal dwelling of the consumer.” Vacation homes, second homes, boats, trailers that are not used as principal residences should not be included for mandatory escrow and would be contrary to the plain language of the statute.

This point is palpable from a plain reading and comparison of the sections 1461 and 1462 of the Dodd-Frank Act. While § 129D(j) (under Section 1462) covers a consumer credit transaction secured by any lien on real property, § 129D(b)-(h) (under Section 1461) cover a consumer credit transaction secured by a first lien on a principal dwelling. We believe that the Act’s wording is deliberate, and should be respected in any final rule.

The definition for dwelling that would be clarified in the proposed rule differs from the existing definition of dwelling in the current 226.2 (a)(19), which provides:

(19) Dwelling means a residential structure that contains one to four units, whether or not that structure is attached to real property. The term includes an individual condominium unit, cooperative unit, mobile home, and trailer, if it is used as a residence.

Escrow accounts or disclosures for property that do not constitute principal residences should not be included, but should be left to the discretion of the creditor. As mentioned above, such interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of sections 1461 and 1462 of the Act.

The Board further seeks to expand the definition of real property as well, to include vacant and unimproved land.³⁰ As discussed above pertaining to dwellings, when defining real property, for purposes of coverage under the Dodd-Frank Act and TILA, the Board should look to the definition of residential mortgage transaction in the existing TILA provisions in addition to the plain language of the Act. The Dodd-Frank Act speaks only to the “principal dwelling of the consumer,” and not second homes, vacation homes, boats, trailers, etc., that are not used as principal residences.³¹

Furthermore, the inclusion of vacant land and unimproved land as contemplated in the proposal is not in accordance with existing TILA and is also opposite to Dodd-Frank Act provisions. The Board seems to look to 129D(j) and its use of real property absent the term “principal residence,” and (h)(3) which addresses improvement to land, as rationale to include real property as a

³⁰ Proposed Rule Section by Section Analysis, 76 Fed. Reg. 1598, 11600.

³¹ Dodd-Frank Act § 1461, 129D(b).

replacement for principal residence and inclusion of vacant land. Section 129D(j) cannot be read in isolation, but must be viewed as part of the full statutory construction of 129D, wherein Congress was clear as to its intent to legislate the principal dwelling. Though 129D(h)(3), alludes to vacant land, it does so for vacant land where escrow is required pursuant to subsection (b), which would apply to a principal residence, therefore contemplating improvements on property that will be used for that purpose.

The result of the Board's proposal is to require a creditor to mandate escrow and provide disclosures for the purchase of vacant residential land where the non-commercial buyer may have no immediate plans to build. Moreover, any plans to build may not be related to a principal residence. The Board's interpretation is beyond statutory intent, and runs the danger of including land or property that will not be used as a principal residence. The only time in which vacant land should be subject to the requirements of 226.19 or 226.45 should be when the real estate is the subject of a principal residence and the property has converted from temporary financing to the permanent phase.

VII. This Rulemaking Should Not Revise a Fundamental TILA Definition That Reaches Beyond Escrows, and That is Central to the CFPB's Integration Project

Under Regulation Z today, an HPML is defined by comparing the loan's APR to the APOR, a measure of market interest rates.³² The Dodd-Frank Act also uses a comparison of APR and APOR to define certain loans for which an escrow is required.³³ It would require one threshold for conforming loans and another for jumbo loans.

The Board proposes to use a different comparison. The Board re-proposes a concept from its 2010 Regulation Z proposal, which, in turn, was based on a 2009 Board proposal. Neither of those proposals is final, and the Board announced February 1, 2011 that it will not finalize either. In the present proposal, the Board explains:

[T]he Board recognized [in 2010] that the use of the annual percentage rate as the coverage metric for the higher-priced mortgage loan protections poses a risk of overinclusive coverage, which was intended to be limited to the subprime market. . . . The data . . . on which the average prime offer rate is based, are limited to contract interest rates and points. Annual percentage rates, on the other hand, are based on a broader set of charges, including some third-party charges such as mortgage insurance premiums. The Board also recognized [in 2010] that, under the 2009 Closed-End Proposal, the annual percentage rate would be based on a finance charge that includes most third-party fees in addition to points, origination fees, and any other fees the creditor

³² 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(a).

³³ Dodd-Frank Act § 1461(a), 124 Stat. at 2178-79 (new TILA § 129D(b)(3)).

retains. Thus, that proposal would expand the existing difference between fees included in the annual percentage rate and fees included in the average prime offer rate.³⁴

The Board in this 2011 rulemaking,³⁵ as it did in 2010,³⁶ proposes to use instead of the APR a “transaction coverage rate,” which is the APR calculated without prepaid finance charges unless the creditor, mortgage broker, or an affiliate of either retains the charges.

The Dodd-Frank Act uses APOR comparisons for more purposes than merely escrow rules. It also uses APOR comparisons for:

- The definition of the interest rate that makes a loan a high-cost mortgage;³⁷
- The treatment of *bona fide* discount points in the high-cost mortgage points and fees test;³⁸
- Ability-to-repay balloon loans;³⁹
- Calculating points and fees on qualified mortgages;⁴⁰
- The definition of qualified mortgage;⁴¹ and
- The definition of higher-risk mortgage,⁴² to which special appraisal rules will apply.

These are among the more significant changes the Dodd-Frank Act made to the TILA. It is critically important that all these new requirements be implemented consistently, in a well-planned and careful manner. It would be ill advised to consider any of these new requirements in isolation because they are all related. The escrow rule needs to be done in coordination with the other provisions that use APOR comparisons.

³⁴ 76 Fed. Reg. 11598, 11609 (March 2, 2011).

³⁵ Proposed 12 C.F.R. § 226.45(a)(2)(i).

³⁶ Then-proposed 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(a)(2), 75 Fed. Reg. 58539, 58710 (September 24, 2010).

³⁷ New TILA § 103(aa)(1)(A)(i).

³⁸ New TILA § 103(dd).

³⁹ New TILA § 129C(a)(6)(D)(ii).

⁴⁰ New TILA § 129C(b)(2)(C)(ii).

⁴¹ New TILA § 129C(c)(1)(B)(ii).

⁴² New TILA § 129H(f)(2).

We are quite concerned about the possibility that there could be multiple, inconsistent definitions if these several comparisons are addressed separately. *Even minor differences in the definitions could create enormous compliance burdens*, even if the practical effect of the differences is minor.

Even if the CFPB were to use the very same definition that the Board proposes in each of the comparisons, implementing the definition in a piecemeal fashion would be unnecessarily burdensome. It would be far less labor-intensive to implement the uniform definition all at once.

RESPA and TILA regulations, as written today, differ in their treatment of third-party charges. Regulation X limits creditors' ability to control certain third-party charges, while the 2010 Regulation Z proposal would penalize creditors who try to comply with Regulation X. This is one area where the two sets of rules, as written today, simply do not work together. Integrating mortgage disclosures is not simply a matter of selecting which disclosure form has the clearest format. Integration will get to the most fundamental rules underlying the disclosures.

Certainly the regulators will be addressing these important issues as they integrate RESPA and TILA rules. A number of important issues will need to be addressed in the process, including tolerances under TILA rules for third-party charges and RESPA § 8 liability for third-party charges. The regulators will also need to strike a difficult balance between the need for accurate disclosures before a loan closes, and the fact that settlement service providers, such as title companies, need flexibility to handle the many third-party charges that can and routinely do change unexpectedly immediately before a real estate transaction closes.

We appreciate the Board's initiative and the care the Board has taken to work in this inherently difficult policy area. At the same time, we do not believe the Board can or should proceed while addressing only the TILA rules. RESPA rules are also important, and the integration of RESPA and TILA rules is very important.

We urge the Board to revise any Regulation Z definitions that may affect mortgage loans only with other regulators as part of the integration project.

The purpose of the transaction coverage rate definition in an escrow rule is to define when escrows are required on HPMLs. For the short time before integrated rules are in place, the definition would not have much effect because, as the Dodd-Frank Act makes clear, borrowers are free to agree to escrows, and very commonly do, even when escrows are not legally required.

Implementing the proposed transaction coverage rate definition in an escrow rule would impose significant regulatory burden because it would require costly systems changes. It could be in place for a short time before it may need to be removed and replaced, which would require additional costly systems changes.

Additionally, as indicated above, The ABA is unclear as to how the transaction coverage rate will be utilized for calculating higher-priced mortgage loans when a creditor finances either the temporary or permanent phase of construction or both. The Board provides in its Staff

Interpretation under Subpart E, that “the appropriate charges from both phases, must be calculated in accordance with section 226.45 (a)(2)(i).”⁴³ We ask that Board make clear what charges would be appropriate in the temporary phase and what charges would be appropriate in the permanent phase.

For these reasons, we urge the Board to use the APR rather than a transaction coverage rate for defining HPMLs until the CFPB decides what fundamental changes to make or not make to TILA definitions.

VIII. Helpful Provisions That Would Not Interfere With RESPA-TILA Integration

The proposed rule does contain provisions other than consumer disclosure requirements. The proposed rule would establish when escrow accounts are and are not required on HPMLs. These provisions would not interfere with the RESPA-TILA integration project, and the Board should adopt them with our suggested refinements.

A. The Proposed 5-Year Escrow Term is Helpful

The proposed rule would provide that required escrow accounts on HPMLs may not be cancelled (unless a loan is terminated) unless the loan is at least five years old, at least 20 percent of the original property value is unencumbered, and the consumer is not delinquent or in default.⁴⁴ We support implementation of this proposed five-year escrow account term. The Dodd-Frank Act requires it.⁴⁵ After five years, the consumer may have enough equity in the house to have an incentive to cover insurance and taxes reliably. Before then, the escrow can help the consumer manage uneven payments and avoid default.

We request, however, a clarification that the requirement to continue to maintain an escrow account when a borrower is experiencing payment difficulties does not alter the RESPA provisions relieving a creditor of the obligation to advance funds to make disbursements in a timely manner when the borrower’s payment is more than 30 days overdue.⁴⁶

B. Unnecessary Escrows Are Not Required

⁴³ 76 Fed. Reg. 11598, 11627 (March 2, 2011).

⁴⁴ Proposed 12 C.F.R. § 226.45(b)(3).

⁴⁵ Dodd-Frank Act § 1461(a), new TILA § 129D(d).

⁴⁶ 24 C.F.R. § 3500.17(k)(2).

The Dodd-Frank Act provides that escrow accounts need not be established for loans secured by shares in a cooperative.⁴⁷ It further provides that insurance premiums need not be escrowed for loans secured by dwellings or units if the consumer must join an association that has an obligation to maintain a master policy insuring the dwellings or units.⁴⁸

The proposed rule would implement these provisions as to HPMLs, which is helpful. It would also make an important clarification that insurance premiums need not be escrowed on HPMLs secured by dwellings in planned unit developments or similar arrangements where the governing association provides the insurance.⁴⁹ This avoids imposing an insurance escrow requirement on loans for which the consumer does not pay insurance directly, which is important. Escrows of hazard insurance premiums in these cases would usually be unnecessary.

There is, however, a need for escrows in the event that a homeowners' association fails to pay for required insurance or fails to provide sufficient insurance coverage, and the borrower also does not obtain sufficient insurance coverage. In this event, it is important that any final rule not interfere with servicers' legal obligation to obtain insurance and to establish an escrow.

C. Provisions That Would Not Interfere With RESPA Integration Need Not Await Integration

Much of the proposed rule would impose unnecessary regulatory burden by requiring duplicative disclosures and a new transaction coverage rate definition that would need to be revised when TILA rules are integrated with RESPA rules. However, rules regarding when an escrow account is required are not as burdensome to implement. The Board's proposed rule that would mandate escrow accounts on HPMLs does not require integration with current RESPA rules because RESPA rules do not overlap in this area. This part of the proposed rule could be finalized without having to undo the compliance work a few months hence.

We support finalizing the provisions of the proposed rule, with our recommended changes, that only set out when an escrow account is required on HPMLs, without requiring a disclosure or defining "transaction coverage rate." These provisions are the proposed deletion of § 226.35(b) and the addition of proposed § 226.45(b).

IX. Small Creditor Exemption

The Board proposes to exempt from the escrow requirements for higher-priced loans, those

⁴⁷ Dodd-Frank Act § 1461(a), new TILA § 129D(e).

⁴⁸ Dodd-Frank Act § 1461(a), new TILA § 129D(e).

⁴⁹ Proposed 12 C.F.R. § 226.45(b)(2)(i) and (ii).

creditors that during the preceding calendar year made more than 50 percent of their loans in counties designated by the Board as predominantly rural or underserved, originate and service 100 or fewer loans (with its affiliates) and do not escrow for any mortgage loan that is serviced (together with its affiliates).

A. Rural and Underserved

The threshold issue for the specific creditor exemption is where the loan is made. According to proposed rule 226.45(b)(2)(iii), with limited exception, creditors that predominantly operate in rural and underserved areas are exempt from the mandatory escrow provisions. The Board provides a narrow definition of “rural” and “underserved,” and relies on urban influence codes published by the Economic Research Service (ERS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. While ABA finds this restrictive definition acceptable, there is concern regarding the consistent use of the proposed definition throughout the regulatory scheme, including and excluding housing related regulations. Banks, bank employees, and consumers experience considerable confusion when the same term has a different meaning, depending on what regulation is being addressed. This confusion may result in errors in judgments and decision-making by the consumer, and the need for financial institutions to potentially establish different metrics within the same lending product.

The definition for underserved, pursuant to proposed rule 226.45(b)(2)(iv)(B), would be a county where no more than two creditors extend consumer credit on first lien real property or dwelling five or more times in that county. While ABA generally agrees with the proposed definition, in that the proposed rule relates only to higher priced loans, the issue of the number of loans offered by the number of creditors over the designated period should also be limited to higher-priced loans. The proposed rule therefore should read:

A county is “underserved” during a calendar year if no more than two creditors extend consumer credit five or more times secured by a first-lien higher-priced mortgage loan on real property or a dwelling during the calendar year in the county.

B. Operates Predominantly

The Board has defined the terms “operate predominantly” to mean a creditor’s extension of 50 percent or more of its higher-priced loans in a rural or underserved area during the preceding calendar year. Though the volume of loans made can be one factor for determining whether a creditor operates predominantly in the designated area, the ABA believes the Board should also look to other factors. For example, mortgage values may be a more accurate determinate as to whether a lender operates “predominantly,” in that this would be a showing of where the predominate amount of a lender’s mortgage assets are committed.

C. Origination of 100 and Fewer and Retention of Servicing rights

The Board proposes that to qualify for the exemption, a creditor, together with its affiliates, must also have originated and retained the servicing rights to 100 or fewer loans secured by a first-lien on real property or a dwelling, during either of the preceding two calendar years. The ABA recommends the Board amend this proposed rule.

To qualify for the exemption, creditors must meet not one, but all of the criteria identified, including the requirement that the creditor predominantly operate in a rural or underserved area. The proposed rule's intent is to ensure that certain small creditors are not burdened with having to establish escrow accounts, and to prevent these creditors from discontinuing higher-priced mortgage products to the disadvantage of rural and underserved communities. Under the rule as proposed, a creditor that has an affiliate, servicing different rural or underserved areas, may together exceed the 100 loan limit, but it would still not be feasible to require such a lender to offer escrow accounts, absent placing a burden on the lender and the consumer. The ABA asks that the Board consider this scenario. It is important to note that there is the additional requirement that the creditor not escrow for loans, together with its affiliates.

That having been said, ABA is concerned with the restrictions on forward commitments. The forward commitment restriction would seek to prevent exempted creditors from selling loans to non-exempt creditors, presumably to prevent the exempt creditors from "gaming" the portfolio exemption requirements. Creditors may sell loans for a number of reasons, including for the purpose of raising capital to meet regulator requests or to increase liquidity for the purpose of making more loans. Under either circumstance, an exempted creditor may find itself in an untenable position if it needed to sell one or more loans from its mortgage portfolio. Other exempt creditors may not be a viable option, because they themselves are attempting to stay under the 100 or fewer loan limit. Non-exempt creditors could not be utilized because doing so may cause the non-exempt creditor to lose its exemption for that loan.

ABA does not disagree with the Board in limiting the use of forward commitments. However, we ask that the Board clarify that it only seeks to limit sales based on forward commitments and not sales in general, whether to exempt or non-exempt creditors. A general limitation on the sale of loans would have a detrimental impact on bank liquidity.

D. Don't Maintain Escrow

The final requirement that creditors must meet to qualify for the exemption is that it, with its affiliates, cannot escrow for any loans it services. This is consistent with the intent of the proposed rule. However, a number of qualifying rural creditors may already escrow for loans pursuant to section 226.35. In instances involving small community banks, many creditors

established escrow account operations only to comply with the Board's July 30, 2008 HPML rule.

The ABA believes that the Board does not intend to exclude from this exemption small banks that constructed escrow operations pursuant to the HPML rules but would otherwise be exempt under this proposal. The Board should make clear that the requirement that the creditor not retain escrow applies only to those loans made after the effective date of the rule.

X. Concepts Should be Consistent with Homeowners Protection Act

ABA appreciates the Board's efforts to craft rules that are consistent with provisions of the Homeowners Protection Act. In this sense, we concur with the pertinent provisions of the proposal, provided that the Board recognize servicers' statutory right to require escrows for the life of a loan. This latter point is crucial to ensuring consistency going forward.

The Dodd-Frank Act requires escrow accounts on certain loans, unless the loan is terminated, for five years, "unless and until—"

- (1) such borrower has sufficient equity in the dwelling securing the consumer credit transaction so as to no longer be required to maintain private mortgage insurance;
- (2) such borrower is delinquent;
- (3) such borrower otherwise has not complied with the legal obligation, as established by rule[.]⁵⁰

A. Sufficient Equity

The Dodd-Frank Act does not define the term "sufficient equity." There are multiple standards for when a borrower has enough equity to permit PMI termination. The HPA has three standards, and the GSEs, FHA, and state laws have others. As a result, this issue requires a clarifying regulation.

The Board proposes to permit cancelation of an escrow account when two conditions are satisfied. One condition relates to equity:

At least 20% of the original value of the property securing the underlying debt obligation is unencumbered[.]⁵¹

⁵⁰ Dodd-Frank Act § 1461(a), new TILA § 129D(d).

⁵¹ Proposed § 226.45(b)(3)(ii)(A).

The Board explains that this proposal is modeled after the HPA.⁵² However, the HPA requires PMI termination on outstanding loans in three circumstances:

- Borrower cancellation. PMI may terminate, upon the borrower's written request, when the balance is first scheduled to reach 80 percent of the original property value, based solely on the amortization schedule, if the borrower has a good payment history, the loan is current, the value of the property securing the loan has not declined below its original value, and the borrower certifies that there is no subordinate lien.⁵³ Original value means the lesser of the sales price reflected in the contract, or the appraised value at the time of consummation; for a refinance, it is the appraised value on which the creditor relied.⁵⁴ The borrower must satisfy the servicer's requirements for evidence that the property value has not declined below its original value.⁵⁵
- Automatic termination. PMI must terminate when the unpaid principal balance, based solely on the applicable amortization schedule, is first scheduled to reach 78 percent of the original value of the property securing the loan, if the loan is or becomes current.⁵⁶
- Final termination. If there is no automatic termination or borrower cancellation, PMI must terminate at the midpoint of the amortization period, if the loan is current.⁵⁷

The Board proposes to use the HPA's borrower cancellation standard, with some differences. Proposed comment 45(b)(3)-3 would provide:

The term 'original value' in § 226.45(b)(3)(ii)(A) means the lesser of the sales price reflected in the sales contract for the property, if any, or the appraised value of the property at the time the transaction was consummated. In determining whether 20% of the original value of the property securing the underlying debt obligation is unencumbered, the creditor or servicer shall count any subordinate lien of which it has reason to know. If the consumer certifies in writing that the equity in the property securing the underlying debit obligation is unencumbered by a subordinate lien, the creditor or servicer may rely upon the certification in making its determination.

⁵² 76 Fed. Reg. 11598, 11613 (March 2, 2011).

⁵³ Homeowners Protection Act § 3(a).

⁵⁴ Homeowners Protection Act § 2(12).

⁵⁵ Homeowners Protection Act § 3(a)(4)(A).

⁵⁶ Homeowners Protection Act §§ 2(18), 3(b).

⁵⁷ Homeowners Protection Act § 3(c).

As under the HPA, the Board proposes to permit borrowers to certify to the servicer whether there are subordinate liens. This is helpful because it uses the same standard as the HPA. However, the regulation should be clear that a creditor's or servicer's reliance cannot be the basis for liability.

The Board asks whether subordinate loans should be disregarded when calculating the consumer's equity. We believe not, because subordinate loans directly and significantly affect the consumer's equity. Moreover, by reducing the consumer's equity, subordinate loans can reduce the incentive a consumer has to pay property taxes and insurance. These are reasons why subordinate loans should be taken into consideration, not ignored.

The Board proposes to require servicers to consider subordinate liens of which it has "reason to know." This term is not clear. If the borrower does not certify that there are no subordinate liens, must the servicer search land records? Searches can be costly. If they are required, the servicer will need to be able to charge the cost to the borrower. We do not believe such research is necessary. Rather, we urge the Board to make clear that a certification by the borrower is sufficient to show the servicer complied with this requirement even if the borrower makes a false statement. This would greatly reduce litigation risk and would eliminate the cost of unnecessary title searches for escrow terminations.

How is the servicer to establish the amount of a subordinate lien? Is it the value recorded in land records? If so, servicers will need to search land records and assess the cost of the search to the borrower. If the subordinate loan is an open-end loan, must the servicer determine the amount drawn down or the maximum credit line? Does the title search or other determination become stale? We recommend that servicers have the ability to rely on an account statement from the subordinate lender that the borrower submits that is no more than 60 days old at the time the creditor relies on it. Servicers should be permitted but not required to seek additional documentation from a consumer.

The proposed rule would measure the percentage of a property value that is "unencumbered[.]"⁵⁸ The meaning of the term unencumbered is unclear because a security interest in a parcel of land normally encumbers the entire parcel, regardless of the loan size in relation to the property value. The security instrument rather than the loan encumbers the land. We recommend relating the loan amount to the property value, as in the HPA

B. Does "Sufficient Equity" Only Apply to Loans with PMI?

The Board solicits comment on whether it should interpret TILA § 129D(d)(1) narrowly to refer only to consumers that pay for PMI. We believe that such a narrow view would be inappropriate. First, Congress did not enact language to that effect. Second, where Congress listed reasons to delay escrow cancellation, the sufficient equity provision is first in the list,

⁵⁸ Proposed 12 C.F.R. § 226.45(b)(3)(ii)(A).

signifying its importance to Congress. Third, the reason Congress used language that, in effect, references the HPA is that Congress intended the two statutes to work together. As a result, we urge the Board not to limit the equity requirement to only those loans that maintain PMI.

C. PMI May Last Shorter or Longer Than Five Years

The Dodd-Frank Act requires that mandatory escrows last for a minimum of five years.⁵⁹ The HPA prohibits PMI, and therefore an escrow for PMI premiums, after one of three thresholds (discussed above) is reached. Sometimes the PMI termination threshold is reached before five years have elapsed, and other times only after five years.

In other words, the Board's proposed rule would require five-year escrows on HPMLs even when the HPA does not permit PMI for five years. In this event, while PMI would no longer be in place, the escrow for other items would remain. We believe the Board's proposal appropriately reflects this specific five-year statutory requirement.

Conversely, in some cases the PMI would remain in place longer than five years. This may appear to create a conflict, requiring a PMI escrow after five years elapse. Relevant here the Board's recognition⁶⁰ that the Dodd-Frank Act gives servicers statutory authority⁶¹ to require escrows for longer than five years, including for the life of the loan. The Board's recognition of the statutory authority resolves any potential conflict or confusion. We therefore believe it is important for the recognition to be carried forward to a final regulation.

⁵⁹ Dodd-Frank Act § 1461(a), new TILA § 129D(d).

⁶⁰ Proposed 12 C.F.R. § 226.45(b)(3)(i) uses the permissive "may".

⁶¹ Dodd-Frank Act § 1461(a), new TILA § 129D(f) (for loans on which escrow is not mandatory) and new TILA § 129D(d) (permitting mandatory escrows to last longer than five years, with no required termination until loan payoff).

D. Property Value

Both the HPA and the Dodd-Frank Act use a measure of equity in the property, which necessitates a measure of the property value. The Dodd-Frank Act does not specify a measure. However, the HPA uses the lesser of the sales price reflected in the contract, or the appraised value at the time of consummation (for refinanced loans, the appraised value on which the creditor relied).⁶² The HPA compares this value to the principal balance based on the amortization schedule (without regard to curtailments).⁶³

The proposed regulation uses the term “the original value”⁶⁴ and the proposed commentary would explain that original value means:

the lesser of the sales price reflected in the sales contract for the property, if any, or the appraised value of the property at the time the transaction was consummated.⁶⁵

We appreciate the Board’s recognition that there may not be a sales contract, such as when an owner inherits a property.

The Board adopted the term original value from the HPA,⁶⁶ and we appreciate the Board’s attempt to harmonize its regulation with the HPA. The Board solicits comment on this approach, however, noting that property values are currently depressed:

The Board is cognizant of the recent nation-wide decline of property values. The Board recognizes that, under the proposal, a creditor or servicer may honor a consumer’s request to cancel their escrow account when the consumer has met all of the pre-conditions of § 226.45(b)(3) even when the consumer does not have 20% equity in their home because of depressed property values at the time. The Board believes that using some method other than the HPA as a model for determining when a borrower has sufficient equity in the property would prove too complicated and create uncertainty.⁶⁷

The Board asks whether, in light of the current nationwide depressed property values, using the HPA measure is appropriate. It would be inappropriate to use a standard other than that established within the HPA. Whether by automatic termination of PMI, or borrower written request, the “original value” amount must be that of the lesser of the appraised value of the

⁶² Homeowners Protection Act § 2(12).

⁶³ Homeowners Protection Act §§ 2(2), 2(7), and 2(18).

⁶⁴ Proposed 12 C.F.R. § 226.45(b)(3)(ii)(A).

⁶⁵ Proposed Comment 45(b)(3)-3.

⁶⁶ 76 Fed. Reg. 11598, 11614 (March 2, 2011).

⁶⁷ 76 Fed. Reg. 11598, 11614 (March 2, 2011).

property at consummation, or the contract price. To establish a standard that would allow for cancellation of escrow based on current market value due to depressed housing prices, while of some benefit to the borrower, does not sufficiently meet the intent of the HPA or escrow of PMI, which is to ensure that the security interest, not the property value, is sufficiently unencumbered to release the borrower from the escrow or PMI obligation.

E. Delinquency or Nonpayment Default

The Dodd-Frank Act would allow for cancellation or termination of escrow unless and until the borrower is delinquent or “otherwise has not complied with the legal obligation, as established by rule[.]”⁶⁸ Presumably, the framers intended to allow for termination of the account if the borrower did not meet the obligations of the mortgage, which would include in cases of foreclosure. The “as established by rule” language appears to intend that the Board, by regulation, would define the term. To avoid confusion, the Board should harmonize the Dodd-Frank Act requirements with the provisions of the HPA.

The HPA defines default in two instances: in cases where a borrower requests an escrow termination,⁶⁹ and when there is an automatic escrow termination.⁷⁰ The former is based on whether the borrower is current and has a good payment history. The latter is based on whether the borrower is current at the time of automatic termination, or if he is not, then on the first day of the first month after delinquency that the borrower becomes current.

The ABA urges the Board to make the regulation consistent with the language and intent of both the Dodd-Frank Act and the HPA. The Board should also include in § 226.45(b)(3)(ii)(B) that the consumer have a “good payment history” as defined in the HPA.⁷¹ This would increase consistency between two sets of rules, while offering better consumer protection. Accordingly, the ABA recommends the following language for § 226.45(b)(3)(ii)(B):

The consumer currently is not delinquent or is not in default on the underlying debt or mortgage or security obligation, and has a good payment history, as defined in the Homeowners Protection Act of 1998.

XI. Congress Did Not Require Escrows Longer Than Five Years

⁶⁸ Dodd-Frank Act § 1461(a), new TILA § 129D(d)(2) and (3).

⁶⁹ Homeowners Protection Act § 3(a).

⁷⁰ Homeowners Protection Act § 3(b).

⁷¹ Homeowners Protection Act § 2(4).

Consistent with concerns expressed about other portions of this rulemaking, ABA believes that the current rulemaking should retain fidelity to the language and structure that is set forth by the Dodd-Frank Act. This is especially important in the initial phases to implement the current legislative reforms. We believe that the Board should neither subtract from the legislative requirements, nor add to the provisions that are provided in the statute. All the provisions contained in the Dodd-Frank Act were subject to vote and represent legislative decisions that express a balance of interests as well as negotiated outcomes. The pursuit of legislative goals should be done within the statutory order, and not extend beyond the language of the Congressional mandate.

ABA's has earnest concerns about assuring consistency with the legislation because there are both consumer protection risks and safety and soundness risks that we believe the Board needs to address regarding escrow terminations. The Dodd-Frank Act requires that mandatory escrows last for at least five years. An escrow account can be terminated prior to the expiration of five years if the borrower has sufficient equity in the property so as to not require mortgage insurance, if the borrower is delinquent, if the borrower has not complied with the loan obligation, or if the underlying loan is terminated.⁷² At this point, the Dodd-Frank Act gives servicers a clear statutory right to cancel the escrow.

The Board proposes to add an additional non-statutory requirement for termination of mandatory HPML escrows. It proposes to prohibit a servicer from terminating the escrow unless the servicer receives "a consumer's request to cancel the escrow account."⁷³

It is likely that the cost of maintaining escrows will increase in the near future for a number of reasons. As one of many possible examples, the Dodd-Frank Act requires each servicer to pay interest on escrowed funds as prescribed by applicable state or federal law.⁷⁴ If the costs of maintaining HPML escrows were to rise to the point that they become unprofitable, servicers would need to cancel them. Without the option to cancel unprofitable HPML escrows, servicers would need to avoid states that impose prohibitive costs on escrows, increase the cost of HPML loans in those states, or withdraw HPML loans from the marketplace. None of these options would be helpful to consumers.

Not providing an option to cancel unprofitable escrow accounts would present a serious safety and soundness risk. It would require servicers to continue unprofitable operations. This is inappropriate policy.

Additionally, there may be a seriously delinquent loan or a property with destruction so severe that the creditor determines that foreclosure is not viable. In this event, the creditor ceases active collection and places the account in a charged off status. The underlying debt obligation is not

⁷² Dodd-Frank Act § 1461(a), new TILA § 129D(d).

⁷³ Proposed 12 C.F.R. § 226.45(b)(3)(i)(B).

⁷⁴ Dodd-Frank Act § 1461(a), new TILA § 129D(g)(3).

terminated, however, and where permitted under applicable state law the creditor may leave the lien in place and recover amounts owed in the event of sale. In this case, it would be appropriate to permit the servicer to cancel the escrow account and provide notice that the borrower is now directly responsible for tax and insurance obligations. Certainly such cases were envisioned by the Dodd-Frank Act framers, in that the legislation allows for termination of escrow accounts prior to the five year period in the event of delinquency or failure to meet the mortgage obligation.⁷⁵ Presumably, the Board adopted the Dodd-Frank Act provisions in section 226.45(b)(3), wherein the Board proposes that escrow can be cancelled by the creditor upon termination of the debt obligation. The ABA requests that the Board make clear the creditor's or servicer's right to terminate escrow under such cases, as provided in Dodd-Frank Act.

The Act does not condition the servicer's right to cancel an escrow on receipt of the borrower's written request. Rather, the servicer's statutory right to cancel is very explicit. TILA § 129D(b) provides that escrows are required in some circumstances. When subsection (b) requires an escrow, it "shall remain in existence for a minimum period of five years[.]"⁷⁶ It may remain longer than five years.

When subsection (b) does not require an escrow—

[N]o provision of this section shall be construed as precluding the establishment or an impound, trust, or other type of account . . .

(1) on terms mutually agreeable to the parties to the loan; [or]

(2) at the discretion of the lender or servicer, as provided by the contract between the lender or servicer and the borrower. . . ."⁷⁷

While the Board has authority under TILA § 129D(b)(4) to mandate escrows on additional types of loans, the Board does not have authority to condition a servicer's clear statutory authority under § 129D(d) and (f) to require escrows.

For all of these reasons, the Board should not interfere with servicer's explicit authority.

XII. Waiting Periods Can Be Harmful to Consumers

The Dodd-Frank Act requires a disclosure and a three-day waiting period before consummation of a loan if an escrow "is required under subsection (b)[.]"⁷⁸ While some consumers may benefit

⁷⁵ Dodd-Frank Act § 1461(a), new TILA § 129D(d).

⁷⁶ Dodd-Frank Act § 1461(a), new TILA § 129D(d).

⁷⁷ Dodd-Frank Act § 1461(a), new TILA § 129D(f).

from three-day waiting periods, consumers can be harmed by waiting periods that unnecessarily delay closings. For example, a consumer may have a contract to buy a house, and another contract to sell a house that requires closing by a date certain. Delayed closings can create substantial financial hardships for consumers, such as loss of a down payment and breach of contract claims. A waiting period can also cause a consumer to lose a rate lock. When interest rates are rising, losing a rate lock can be very costly to a consumer. *The economic harm from waiting periods can far outweigh any escrow benefits.*

Waiting periods do not seem to offer any benefit when a consumer with an escrow is refinancing into a loan that also has an escrow, or when a consumer without an escrow is refinancing into a loan that also has no escrow.

If a waiting period is not waivable, we urge the Board to have any waiting period on a refinance run concurrently with the rescission waiting period. The consumer would still have three days to deliberate the escrow decision, but the consumer may be able to save a valuable rate lock.

The issue of “waiting periods” is, of course, a perfect illustration of the need to better understand consumer needs before regulating in this space. Overall, as expressed above, ABA insists that the current requirements be delayed and incorporated into the broader RESPA-TILA reform process, so that the timing requirements of these different disclosures can be coordinated with precision and with an eye towards consumer understanding and protection. Advancing in piecemeal fashion, as this proposal aims to do, will sow very serious complexities to the “waiting period” problem as we seek to impose wholesale fixes to the mortgage finance delivery system. We again urge that the Board require waiting periods only when necessary because of their potential for consumer harm.

A. A Regulation Should Not Require New Waiting Periods

Some loans will have escrows that are not “required under subsection (b),” and some loans will not have escrows at all. The proposed rule would require an escrow disclosure *and* a three-day waiting period for all closed-end loans secured by a first lien on real property or a dwelling.⁷⁹ This is well beyond what Congress required, and would be harmful to many consumers. Congress was specific that waiting periods are not required for voluntary escrows and are not required for loans with no escrows.⁸⁰ Waiting periods beyond what Congress requires are unauthorized.

B. Additional Waiting Periods Should Not be Required After a Consumer Changes an Election

⁷⁸ Dodd-Frank Act § 1461(a), new TILA § 129D(h).

⁷⁹ Proposed 12 C.F.R. § 226.19(f) and (f)(4).

⁸⁰ Dodd-Frank Act § 1461(a), new TILA § 129D(h).

If, after receiving a notice three days before a scheduled closing, a consumer changes an election of whether to have an escrow, a new waiting period should not be required. This change of mind demonstrates that the consumer has finished asking questions and *understands* the escrow decision, so no additional time should be required. If another waiting period were to be required in this event, it could cause the consumer to withdraw the change of election to avoid the waiting period. That is, it could cause the consumer to reject a desired escrow or accept an undesired escrow. This would not be a consumer protection.

C. Waiting Periods Should Not be Required For Escrow Terminations

The Dodd-Frank Act, plainly a consumer protection law, authorizes servicers to terminate voluntary escrows, and mandatory escrows that meet the required duration, without any waiting period.⁸¹ The proposed rule would require a three-day waiting period when an escrow terminates.⁸²

A waiting period for an escrow termination does not have an apparent purpose. The Board does not address any evidence of lack of consumer understanding of escrow terminations. The Board does not establish that a disclosure alone would be insufficient. Especially given that consumer mortgage disclosures are in the process of being integrated and redesigned, any question of ineffective disclosures can be addressed as part of that redesign. A consumer who regrets having terminated an escrow can almost always reestablish it. Moreover, an escrow can be cancelled only if the debt obligation has not been met, the obligation has otherwise been terminated, or if certain conditions are met, after five years and upon written request of the consumer.

Additionally, a waiting period for a termination would be inconsistent with the HPA. The HPA requires termination of PMI in specified circumstances. In some cases, PMI is the only escrowed item, meaning that its termination also requires an escrow termination. The HPA has a statutory timing schedule that servicers must follow. It would be wholly inappropriate for the TILA escrow rule to be inconsistent with the HPA.

A waiting period for an escrow termination also contradicts proposed § 226.45(b)(3)(i)(A), which, following Dodd-Frank Act,⁸³ permits cancellation of an escrow when a loan is paid in full. Consumers do not necessarily inform servicers before paying off a loan, so servicers cannot necessarily provide a three-day waiting period before a loan is repaid. More importantly, there is absolutely no reason why a consumer would need three days to debate and ponder whether to terminate an escrow on a loan that has been repaid and no longer exists.

For all these reasons, we believe a waiting period to terminate an escrow should not be required.

⁸¹ Dodd-Frank Act § 1461(a), new TILA § 129D(f).

⁸² Proposed 12 C.F.R. § 226.20(d)(4).

⁸³ Dodd-Frank Act § 1461(a), new TILA § 129D(d)(4).

D. Waiting Periods Should Be Waivable Under a Workable Standard

The Board discusses in its proposal circumstances under which a consumer may have a *bona fide* personal financial emergency permitting a waiver of the proposed waiting period. The proposed rule would permit waivers if all consumers liable on the loan give the creditor a signed, dated, written statement that describes the emergency and specifically modifies or waives the waiting period.⁸⁴ The commentary, however, would effectively prohibit any waivers:

Whether there is a *bona fide* personal financial emergency is determined by the facts surrounding individual circumstances. A *bona fide* personal financial emergency typically, but not always, will involve imminent loss of or harm to a dwelling or harm to the health or safety of a natural person. A waiver is not effective if the consumer's statement is inconsistent with facts known to the creditor.⁸⁵

The commentary would permit waivers only when the creditor makes a determination about the facts underlying the claim of emergency and the individual facts of each request. Creditors are unable to make factual determinations of this nature because the term "*bona fide* personal financial emergency" is vague, not easily verifiable, subjective, and imposes substantial litigation risk on creditors and servicers. Even if creditors could investigate underlying facts, by the time a creditor finishes its investigation, the three days would have lapsed. Thus, waivers would be effectively prohibited even in case of emergency.

We note that this waiver standard is very close to the standard the Board established for waivers of three-day waiting periods for rescissions.⁸⁶ We support having a consistent standard because compliance with one standard is less burdensome than compliance with multiple standards. We urge, though, that the standard be one that creditors and servicers are capable of applying so that consumers will not be disadvantaged.

E. Waiving an Escrow Waiting Period Should Not Require Waiving a Rescission Waiting Period

We are concerned that the Board's proposal, in effect, would permit preclosing escrow waiting period waivers only when the consumer also waives the rescission waiting period. We do not believe the Board intended this result.

The proposed rule would permit a consumer to waive an escrow waiting period "if the consumer determines that the loan proceeds are needed before the waiting period ends to meet a *bona fide*

⁸⁴ Proposed 12 C.F.R. § 226.19(f)(6).

⁸⁵ Proposed Comment 19(f)(6).2.

⁸⁶ 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.15(e)(1); 226.23(e)(1).

personal financial emergency.”⁸⁷ The waiting period this refers to is that provided in § 226.19(f)(4), the escrow waiting period rather than the rescission waiting period.

Proposed escrow waiting periods run for three days before loan consummation.⁸⁸ On a refinance, a consumer also has a three-day rescission waiting period that runs for three days after consummation.

If the loan proceeds are needed before the preclosing waiting period ends, the closing must be accelerated. The post-closing rescission period would also need to be waived to make the funds available on an emergency basis before the escrow waiting period ends.

We recommend changing proposed paragraph 19(f)(6) to provide that the preclosing waiting period is waivable “if the consumer determines that the loan proceeds are needed before the waiting period ends.” This would permit a consumer to waive an escrow waiting period to take advantage of a rate-lock that is about to expire, and still have a full rescission waiting period.

⁸⁷ Proposed § 226.19(f)(6).

⁸⁸ Proposed 12 C.F.R. § 226.19(f)(4).

XIII. Clarifications in Disclosures

ABA has various recommendations for improving the proposed disclosures. We observe, however, that these suggestions are intended to inform the CFPB if it were to carry forward with the Board's proposal rather incorporate these changes into RESPA-TILA reform. ABA again repeats its view that the disclosures subject to the current proposal are linked to, and intertwined with, existing disclosures under RESPA, TILA, and other statutes, and that isolated amendments under this rulemaking are counterproductive to the goals of full regulatory reform ordered by Congress. We reiterate our overarching concern that the industry should not be required to come into compliance with regulatory revisions that will be replaced shortly after implementation begins. We reiterate that these disclosures should not be required on a form separate from and in addition to the existing disclosures, but should be integrated with them.

We also note that when RESPA and TILA rules are integrated, it will be important to distinguish where RESPA and where TILA is the basis for the rule. The two statutes are different, and Congress enacted them at different times for different purposes.

TILA's purpose is to "assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit."⁸⁹

RESPA's purpose is to effect certain changes in the settlement process for residential real estate that will result—

(1) in more effective advance disclosure to home buyers and sellers of settlement costs; . . . [and]

(3) in a reduction in the amounts home buyers are required to place in escrow accounts established to insure the payment of real estate taxes and insurance[.]⁹⁰

We note that RESPA, but not TILA, requires delivery of "a good faith estimate of the amount or range of charges for specific settlement services the borrower is likely to incur in connection with the settlement"⁹¹ within three business days of receipt of a loan application.⁹²

TILA requires escrow in some cases and lenders require them in other cases. Credit is a borrowing, and *voluntary* escrows are not part of the terms of borrowing. They are a convenience for the consumer, not a cost of credit. The fact that they are voluntary underscores that they are not a required cost of credit and the CFPB cannot require them under TILA. The

⁸⁹ TILA § 102(a).

⁹⁰ RESPA § 2(b).

⁹¹ RESPA § 5(c).

⁹² RESPA § 5(d).

CFPB certainly will have authority to require disclosures about voluntary escrows, but it is important to be clear that its authority will not derive from TILA.

Finally, throughout this section, we point out inconsistencies in terms and common word usage that are likely to confound the public, as well as the legal application of many of the provisions herein. This imprecision is unnecessary and avoidable. We note that the particular wording and use of nomenclature in escrow-related regulations was fully discussed and vetted in the lengthy and extensive implementation for the escrow accounts provisions under RESPA, which started in 1995 and lasted until 1998 and beyond.⁹³ The Board and/or CFPB would greatly benefit from reviewing HUD's administrative record to ensure that consumers are not confused by differences in classifications and categorizations among the two escrow disclosure mandates. Once again, delaying this rule to allow its consideration under the RESPA-TILA integration process would be an optimal approach proper implementation.

A. Escrow Accounts Are Not Necessarily Trust Accounts

The proposed disclosures, following the language in § 1461 of the Dodd-Frank Act, refer to escrow accounts as trusts. Whether an escrow account is a trust is a matter of state law. It would be misleading to tell a consumer an escrow account is a trust when it is not. We recommend against using the term "trust" in any escrow disclosure.

The Board understandably tried to implement Congressional intent. However, we cannot believe Congress intended to require a misleading disclosure about a fact as legally significant as whether an escrow is a trust.

B. The Term Home-Related is Vague

The proposed disclosures warn consumers about the consequences of not paying "home-related" costs, and that without an escrow, the consumer would need to pay "home-related" costs directly. The term "home-related" is vague. There are many home-related costs that are not escrowed, such as condominium dues, ground rents, and maintenance costs. It may be clearer to specify taxes, insurance, or other costs. The fact that they are related to the consumer's home will be apparent.

C. Payments May Not be Annual or Semiannual

The proposed disclosure about the risk of not having an escrow states that the consumer would need to directly pay semi-annual or annual payments. Payments commonly are at other intervals, such as quarterly or monthly, so the proposed language would be misleading. This disclosure would be more accurate if it were to say:

⁹³ See 61 FR 13233 (March 26, 1996); 61 FR 46510 (September 3, 1996); 61 FR 50219 (September 24, 1996); 61 FR 58476 (November 15, 1996); 63 FR 3236 (January 21, 1998).

What would be the risk of not having taxes, insurance, or other costs escrowed?	You would be responsible for directly paying these costs, through potentially large periodic payments. The payments may not be monthly.
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D. Fees May Not be Fixed Dollar Amounts

The proposed disclosure about a fee for not having an escrow account is unnecessarily specific. It specifies a “fee” only as a dollar amount. It is possible that a creditor does not assess a dollar fee for not having an escrow but charges a higher rate or points. We suggest that the disclosure read: “Will I be charged for choosing not to have an escrow? [Yes. For choosing not to have an escrow account, you will be charged [a fee of \$___] [an additional ___ percentage point(s) in your loan rate] [an additional ___ point(s) for your loan].]”

E. Consumers Requests for Escrows

Proposed Form H-25 contains the question “Can I set up an escrow on my mortgage?” We suggest more flexibility in answering the question. We suggest providing a “no” option to accommodate creditors who do not provide escrows. For those willing to set up an escrow account at any time, the date would not be relevant. For those who may not know, when providing the disclosure, whether they will offer escrows in the future, the definitive “Yes” to the question could be misleading or inaccurate.

We also recommend that the disclosure warn borrowers that they must pay taxes and insurance until an optional escrow is established.

Taking these comments together, we suggest the integrated disclosure read:

Can I set up an escrow account on my mortgage?	<p>[No. We do not offer escrows.]</p> <p>[Yes, you can request an escrow at any time by contacting us at [(telephone number)][(secure website)]. You will need to pay your taxes, insurance and other costs until the escrow is established and funded.]</p> <p>[Please tell us if you want to set up an escrow account on your mortgage by contacting us at [(telephone number)][(secure website)].]</p>
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F. Escrows May Not Include All Taxes and Insurance

There may be more than one type of insurance on the same loan. Some homeowners purchase flood insurance coverage voluntarily and do not inform the creditor, so the premiums are not escrowed. The proposed model form for establishment of an escrow does not distinguish between different escrowed items. It states:

We estimate that your home-related costs will total \$____ for the first year of your mortgage. . . . If you did not have an escrow account, you would be responsible for directly paying your home-related costs through potentially large semi-annual or annual payments. . . . [Y]our regular mortgage payments will include an additional \$____ that will be deposited into your escrow account.

We suggest that the integrated model disclosures make clear how much would go into an escrow account, initially and periodically, for each escrowed item.

XIV. Effective Dates Need Clarification

A. Unclear Effective Date of the Statute

Section 1400(c) of the Dodd-Frank Act has a complicated provision about effective dates for Title XIV provisions. It states that if a regulation implements a “section, or provision thereof,” the regulation sets the effective date of the “section, or provision thereof” of the statute.⁹⁴ If there is no regulation by the deadline (18 months after the designated transfer date) for a “section[,]” the section becomes effective 18 months after the designated transfer date.⁹⁵

This raises the question about instances where one section has multiple provisions and there is an implementing regulation for some, but not all, of those provisions. For the provision without an implementing regulation by the deadline, when does the provision become effective? Is it 18 months after the designated transfer date, or is it the date the regulation implementing another provision of the same section becomes effective? The statute is unclear.

The proposed rule would implement §§ 1461 and 1462. Section 1461 has provisions that the proposed rule does not directly address:

- TILA § 129D(b)(1) and (2) (escrows required by law, or for loans made, guaranteed, or insured by a federal or state agency);
- TILA § 129D(d) (duration of non-HPML mandatory escrows)

⁹⁴ Dodd-Frank Act § 1400(c)(2), 124 Stat. at 2136.

⁹⁵ Dodd-Frank Act § 1400(c)(3), 124 Stat. at 2136.

- TILA § 129D(f) (permitting voluntary escrows);
- TILA § 129D(g) (administration of escrows); and
- TILA § 129D(i) (insurance definitions).

We believe all Title XIV regulations that implement part, but not all, of a section need to specify which provisions they intend to implement and which they do not. In this way, the effective dates will be clear.

B. The Board Should Coordinate Implementation Deadlines

The proposal does not address when any final rule would be effective and when compliance would be required. We again stress the need for integration with the other upcoming disclosure changes. We urge the Board to set any final effective date only in coordination with the CFPB implementation team. Consumer mortgage disclosures are undergoing entire redesign. We very strongly urge that implementation of all the changes be planned and coordinated together so that we can implement them in the order that minimizes redoing systems changes. To accommodate the extensive resources that will be needed to implement new escrow rules, with or without disclosure revisions, we urge that new rules be permitted no fewer than 12 months to implement. This would help provide the time necessary to retool systems, educate staff, and develop internal procedures to comply with the new escrow duration period and standard.

C. Uncertainty About Retroactivity of the Regulation

We request clarification that the requirement that escrows be maintained for five years on HPMLs will not apply retroactively to loans that predate the effective date of the regulation and that do not have escrows.

Similarly, we request clarification that escrow disclosures would not be required for loans that were originated before a new escrow disclosure rule becomes effective.

XV. Incomplete Disclosure of Escrow Cancellation or Noncreation

When a loan does not have an escrow, the servicer must monitor the payment of required items, such as taxes and insurance. Servicers may require the consumer to send receipts of payment or verification of sufficient insurance coverage. The proposed model forms for nonestablishment or cancellation of an escrow, and the regulation, would not permit the creditor to include this important information.⁹⁶ We recommend that creditors be allowed to add information they deem important to the disclosure.

⁹⁶ Proposed 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.19(f)(3); 226.20(d)(3).

XVI. Clarification That Regulation Removes Ambiguity

The statute provides that mandatory escrows must remain in existence for five years “unless and until . . . such borrower is delinquent [or] such borrower otherwise has not complied with the legal obligation, as established by rule[.]”⁹⁷

We do not believe Congress intended to require an escrow for five years or “until” the loan is delinquent in under five years. Nor do we believe Congress intended to require an escrow for five years or “until” the borrower is in non-payment default in under five years. Rather, it seems clear that Congress meant that the escrow is to remain for five years, “unless” the borrower is delinquent or otherwise in default, in which case it is to remain longer than five years.

The proposed rule is consistent with this apparent Congressional intent by permitting cancellation “only upon the earlier of” certain events.⁹⁸ This is a very helpful clarification of ambiguous language.

We request that the Board be very explicit that it is clarifying the ambiguous “unless and until” language with language that could appear to have a different meaning.

XVII. The Proposed Rule Would Require Mortgage Disclosures on Nonmortgage Loans

The proposed rule is not limited to mortgage loans. It would require escrow disclosures in connection with “closed-end transactions secured by a first lien on real property or a dwelling[.]”⁹⁹ Dwellings are not necessarily real property. Manufactured homes, mobile homes, and cooperatives may be personal property under the laws of some states. Additionally, a consumer may reside in a recreational vehicle or a boat, which are most likely personal property. The Board explains:

The Board believes that coverage of the same types of property under the disclosure requirements for the establishment as well as the non-establishment of an escrow account would promote the informed use of credit by consumers and compliance by creditors. The disclosures for the establishment of an escrow account likely would be just as useful to a consumer entering into a transaction secured by a second or vacation home or vacant or unimproved land as it would to a consumer entering into a transaction secured by a principal dwelling. Similarly, the disclosures for the non-establishment of an escrow account should cover all dwellings, whether or not they are deemed to be real or personal property under state law. Furthermore, the coverage of all dwellings would eliminate the

⁹⁷ Dodd-Frank Act § 1461(a), new TILA § 129D(d)(2) and (3).

⁹⁸ Proposed 12 C.F.R. § 226.45(b)(3)(i).

⁹⁹ Proposed 12 C.F.R. § 226.19(f); § 226.20(d).

analysis that creditors would have to undertake to determine whether and which disclosures would be triggered when a transaction will be secured by any one of various types of dwellings.¹⁰⁰

We agree with the Board that the distinction between real and personal property under state law should not affect escrow accounts for loans on manufactured homes, mobile homes, and cooperatives. However, we do not believe it would be useful to require escrow accounts or disclosures on loans secured by other types of personal property that could, in rare circumstances, be a dwelling, such as recreational vehicles or boats.

It is not clear what would be the average prime offered rate for a comparable vehicle or boat loan, so it is unclear how to determine whether the loan is higher-priced. Assuming a definition of higher-priced mortgage loan for a vehicle or boat loan could be created, this effectively would mean that the Board proposes that a creditor give a consumer who borrows against a motor vehicle or boat a disclosure about whether “your mortgage” has an escrow. It is quite unlikely the consumer will understand this disclosure. The consumer may believe the creditor delivered the disclosure in error, and would therefore disregard it.

The Board wishes to prevent the difficulty of determining which type of disclosure to give based on dwelling type. The difficulty is that some creditors will not be able to define “dwelling.” This uncertainty would cause creditors making closed-end loans on anything that might be used as a dwelling to give an escrow disclosure. We recommend limiting any escrow rules to loans secured by real property and by manufactured homes, mobile homes, and cooperatives that may be used as dwellings and are the consumer’s principal residence.

XVIII. Clarification on Mortgage Related Obligations

The Board would require as part of its proposal related to Subpart E—Special Rules for Certain Home Mortgage Transactions, that a creditor include in its repayment ability, the analysis of “expected property taxes and premiums for mortgage-related insurance required by the creditor...”¹⁰¹ ABA members are concerned about potential TILA liability associated with this provision, as proposed and would recommend that the Board make revisions. Creditors provide consumers an estimate of anticipated monthly payments, including property taxes and premiums for mortgage-related insurance in the GFE and the HUD 1 settlement documents. Creditors use these estimates, with anticipated principal and interest amounts, to determine a consumer’s ability to repay. The ABA would ask that the Board clarify that a creditor’s reliance on calculations made to establish HUD 1 settlement and GFE statements satisfies the requirements of the proposed provision. The ABA would therefore recommend the following language:

¹⁰⁰ 76 Fed. Reg. 11598, 11600-01 (March 2, 2011).

¹⁰¹ Proposed 34(a)(4)(i).

Mortgage-related obligations. For purposes of this paragraph (a)(4), mortgage-related obligations are estimated property taxes, premiums for mortgage-related insurance required by the creditor as set for in § 226.45(b)(1), [§ 226.25(b)(3)(i), and similar expenses.

XIX. Conclusion

We urge the Board and CFPB to delay this rulemaking so that it may be incorporated into the deliberations regarding full-scale mortgage reforms under the Dodd-Frank Act. Congress requires that RESPA and TILA rules be integrated, and this mandate requires that policymakers begin immediate consideration of disclosure reform possibilities. This forward planning is already occurring, as evidenced by the various announcements by the Department of Treasury and CFPB that the combining and streamlining of RESPA and TILA disclosures are a priority. The enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act has dramatically altered the TILA statute and, indeed, the regulatory landscape. This legislation is intended to usher in a new era of stronger, coordinated regulation in which streamlined and simplified rules ensure transparency and promote fair competition. To achieve this objective, ABA believes that all federal banking agencies have a duty to work with those organizing the Bureau to develop a comprehensive plan for disclosure reform that includes an agenda and timetable to propose, finalize and implement all mortgage disclosure revisions by the Board or the Bureau and other agencies in an orderly manner.

ABA believes the Dodd-Frank Act directs the Board to consider this escrow rulemaking effort as part of that broader mortgage reform effort, and to minimize the addition of duplicative forms and repetitive rulemakings in favor of a more comprehensive approach that achieves larger objectives in terms of consumer benefit and shopper protections. To the extent that any Regulation X or Regulation Z amendment would affect that important integration project, it must work towards, not against, integration. The disclosures this proposed rule would require do not contribute to integrated disclosures. The disclosures should be pursued only as part of integrated rules. The proposed definition of a “transaction coverage rate” for the same reason should be pursued only as part of integrated rules.

The ABA remains willing to assist the Board with the important tasks of assessing and quantifying regulatory burden.

Sincerely,



Robert R. Davis

cc: Office of Management and Budget
Paperwork Reduction Project [7100-0199]
Washington, D.C. 20503

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I. The Board Has Not Complied With the Paperwork Reduction Act

A. Purpose and Legislative History of the Paperwork Reduction Act

Congress enacted the Paperwork Reduction Act to reduce unnecessary regulatory burden.

The purposes of this chapter are to—

(1) minimize the paperwork burden for individuals, small businesses, educational and nonprofit institutions, Federal contractors, State, local and tribal governments, and other persons¹⁰²

The legislative history of the law makes clear that Congress intended the law to do as its name states – reduce paperwork.

The Paperwork Reduction Act takes statutory steps needed to reduce and minimize the burden government paperwork imposes on the public. . . . The bill . . . ensures that paperwork required from the public is first checked to see whether the information requested is:

- (1) needed;
- (2) not duplicative; and
- (3) collected efficiently.¹⁰³ . . .

There is, in our opinion, an overriding objective to insure [sic] that the paperwork burden government imposes on the public is neither duplicative nor burdensome.¹⁰⁴ . . .

It is the intent of this legislation to reduce and minimize the government paperwork and reporting requirements imposed on all sectors of the public.¹⁰⁵

Congress reaffirmed this legislative history in 1995, when it broadened the Paperwork Reduction Act.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² 44 U.S.C. § 3501.

¹⁰³ S. Rep. 96-930, at 2 (1980).

¹⁰⁴ *Id.* at 14.

¹⁰⁵ *Id.* at 59.

B. Required Procedures for Valid Collections of Information

The Paperwork Reduction Act regulates, and places limitations on, what it terms a “collection of information.” Despite its name, a collection of information includes, among other things, a federal regulation that requires regulated parties to make disclosures to third parties. The present proposed rule would require creditors to make disclosures to consumers, and would therefore be a collection of information subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act.

A collection of information must be preceded by several specific procedural steps. If the necessary procedures are not followed, the collection of information is unenforceable.

A collection of information that is in a regulation must be reviewed initially, it must be published and there must be a public comment period, the sponsoring agency must certify to a number of specified facts, and the collection of information must be approved.

In most cases, an agency reviews the collection of information initially, then the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reviews it, and the Director of OMB gives final approval or disapproval. In the case of the Federal Reserve Board, OMB has delegated to the Board authority to review and approve collections of information.¹⁰⁷ In this discussion, references to statutory language and legislative history will replace “Director” with “Board” to reflect this delegation.

The Paperwork Reduction Act requires the [Board] to:

[M]inimize the Federal information collection burden, with particular emphasis on those individuals and entities most adversely affected.¹⁰⁸

To emphasize the importance of reducing and minimizing the regulatory burden of information collections, Congress again directed each agency to:

[R]educer information collection burdens on the public[.]¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ The purpose of the ‘Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995’ (S. 244, as amended), is to:

(1) Reaffirm the fundamental purpose of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980—to minimize the Federal paperwork burdens imposed on the public by Government[.]” S. Rep. 104-8, at 1 (1995).

¹⁰⁷ 5 C.F.R. Part 1320, Appendix A at 1(a).

¹⁰⁸ 44 U.S.C. § 3504(c)(3).

¹⁰⁹ 44 U.S.C. § 3506(b)(1)(A).

When an agency initiates a collection of information, it must review the collection before submitting it to the [Board]. The review must, among other things, include:

[A]n evaluation of the specific need for the collection of information;¹¹⁰ [and]

[A] specific, objectively supported estimate of burden[.]¹¹¹

After this review, *Federal Register* publication is required, followed by a 60-day comment period.¹¹²

After the comment period and before an agency submits a collection of information to the [Board] for review, the agency must:

[C]ertify (and provide a record supporting such certification, including public comments received by the agency) that each collection of information . . .

(A) is **necessary** for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including that the information has practical utility;

(B) is not **unnecessarily duplicative** of information otherwise reasonably accessible to the agency;

(C) **reduces** to the extent practicable and appropriate the burden on persons who shall provide information to or for the agency, including with respect to small entities . . .

(E) is to be implemented in ways consistent and **compatible**, to the maximum extent practicable, **with the existing reporting** and recordkeeping practices of those who are to respond;

(F) indicates for each recordkeeping requirement the length of **time persons are required to maintain the records** specified;

(H) has been developed by an office that has planned and allocated resources for the efficient and effective management and use of the information to be collected, including the processing of the information in a manner which shall **enhance**, where appropriate, **the utility of the information** to agencies and the public[.]¹¹³

The [Board] may then approve or disapprove of the collection of information.

Before approving a proposed collection of information, the [Board] shall determine whether the collection of information by the agency is **necessary** for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the **information shall**

¹¹⁰ 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(1)(A)(i).

¹¹¹ 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(1)(A)(iv).

¹¹² 44 U.S.C. §§ 3506(c)(2)(A); 3507(d)(1)(B).

¹¹³ 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(3) (emphasis added).

have practical utility. Before making a determination the [Board] may give the agency and other interested persons an opportunity to be heard or to submit statements in writing. To the extent, if any, that the [Board] determines that the collection of information by an agency is unnecessary for any reason, the agency may not engage in the collection of information.¹¹⁴

If the [Board] approves the information collection, it is assigned a “control number.” This process and the control number are necessary for a collection of information to be enforceable.

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information that is subject to this subchapter if—

(1) the collection of information does not display a valid control number assigned by the [Board] in accordance with this subchapter; or

(2) the agency fails to inform the person who is to respond to the collection of information that such person is not required to respond to the collection of information unless it displays a valid control number.

(b) The protection provided by this section may be raised in the form of a complete defense, bar, or otherwise at any time during the agency administrative process or judicial action applicable thereto.¹¹⁵

C. The Proposed Rule Violates Both the Spirit and Language of the Paperwork Reduction Act

Congress enacted the Paperwork Reduction Act to reduce and minimize regulatory burdens, as discussed above. In contrast to these important purposes, the proposed rule would unnecessarily increase regulatory burden.

The proposed rule would create new disclosure requirements relating to escrow accounts in connection with consumer mortgage loans. RESPA rules already have in place a comprehensive set of required escrow disclosures. The proposed rule would require new disclosures in addition to, not instead of, the RESPA disclosures. The two sets of disclosures are in substance extremely similar. *See* section III of this comment letter, above. Therefore, there is no reason for the proposed disclosures. Consumers already receive too many disclosures, which are often

¹¹⁴ 44 U.S.C. § 3508 (emphasis added).

¹¹⁵ 44 U.S.C. § 3512.

overlapping and sometimes contradictory. This is the reason Congress enacted its triple mandate that the disclosures be integrated, as discussed above.

The proposed rule would add a redundant collection of information, unnecessarily requiring redisclosures of the same information. Thus, the proposed disclosures would unnecessarily increase regulatory burden.

In addition, the new disclosures likely would be in place only for a short time. When the regulators integrate the RESPA and TILA rules, they will have to integrate any final rule that results from the present rulemaking. It is highly likely that the regulators will retain some, but not all, aspects of both the RESPA and TILA rules. That means it is likely that creditors nationwide would need to undo some of the changes the present rulemaking would require.

The proposed disclosure would be costly to implement. Implementation would require changes to the technology systems that the industry uses to: determine which loans require which disclosures; track the date by which the disclosures are required; produce disclosures; and track delivery of disclosures. Consumers will certainly ask questions about the new disclosures and requirements. This means loan originators nationwide will need to be trained in all the new requirements. Consumer questions will come into servicers' call centers, so responses to foreseeable questions will need to be scripted and inserted into the technology systems that call centers use to accurately answer questions quickly. Those who use the scripts will need to be trained. Gaps in the responses to consumer questions inevitably arise with new disclosures and requirements. These will need to be tracked, managed, and addressed. Every change will need to be communicated to every loan originator. Amended call center scripts will need to be implemented.

The industry's mortgage technology systems are highly specialized and complex. They have many interacting and intersecting operations, so that changing one affects many. Systems changes require careful and deliberate change management documentation and processes, extensive testing of changes, and often revisions in response to test results. Systems changes require advanced skills that are so specialized that they are not widely available.

The proposed disclosures would require a number of changes that would need to be at least partially undone when the regulators integrate TILA and RESPA rules. Removing system changes is also burdensome.

The proposed disclosures would impose a very heavy burden that is not required; would not benefit consumers; and would be in place for a very short period of time, after which creditors would be required to undo the rule's implementation. For these reasons, the proposed disclosures violate both the language and the spirit of the Paperwork Reduction Act.

D. The Proposed Collection of Information Lacks the Required Evaluation of a “Specific Need”

The Paperwork Reduction Act requires an “evaluation of the specific need for the collection of information[.]”¹¹⁶ The Board’s analysis lacks one. There is no need for the proposed disclosures, for the following reasons.

First, the proposed disclosures are beyond the Board’s authority because the triple Congressional mandate to integrate mortgage rules prohibits any rule that would move away from the required integration, as discussed above.

Second, the proposed disclosures are unnecessary because they would be redundant. Under RESPA rules, lenders and settlement service providers are required to deliver to consumers disclosures that are substantially the same as those this rulemaking proposes. The Board does not take the position that there is anything amiss with the RESPA escrow disclosures. The Board would simply add another redundant layer of disclosures.

Third, it is unnecessary as evidenced by the fact that the Board has had authority to require this rule since 1968 and has never before 2011 determined that use of that authority was necessary. The Board cites no fact about recent changes relating to escrow accounts that make a redundant disclosure suddenly necessary.

Fourth, neither §§ 1461 or 1462 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which the proposed rule would implement, require the Board to undertake any rulemaking.

E. The Collection of Information Lacks Objective Support for its Arbitrary Burden Numbers

The Paperwork Reduction Act requires an agency to review a “specific, objectively supported estimate of burden[.]”¹¹⁷

In the present rulemaking, the Board states:

The Board estimates that the 1,138 respondents regulated by the Federal Reserve would take, on average, 40 hours (one business week) to update their systems and internal procedure manuals and to provide training for relevant staff to comply with the new

¹¹⁶ 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(1)(A)(i).

¹¹⁷ 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(1)(A)(iv).

disclosure requirements in §§ 226.19(f) and 226.20(d).¹¹⁸

This statement is neither objective nor supported. It is a conclusory statement lacking factual support of any type.

Significantly, it did not take into account specific facts previously made known to the Board. In a comment letter to the Board dated December 24, 2009, Docket Number R-1366, the Consumer Mortgage Coalition responded to the Board's estimate that that rulemaking would impose a burden of 200 hours, stating:

We respectfully submit that this estimate is extremely low.

The notice of proposed rulemaking runs almost 200 *Federal Register* pages. Just reading the proposal, let alone understanding its implications, took days. Preparing this comment letter required assembling a team who then worked on this project for over four months. Once the final rule is published, the industry will then have to implement the rule, which will then reasonably take at least 24 months. There are a number of different loan origination technology systems across the industry, as well as within individual companies. Implementing Regulation Z amendments will require each revision to be programmed, implemented, and then tested, separately in each of these origination systems. Changes to loan origination systems must be made in a coordinated fashion because each change can impact other changes that are being designed and made simultaneously. Coordination itself is a labor-intensive task.

For some perspective, we note that at one large lender, implementing the Regulation Z amendments that became effective October 1, 2009 required over 70,000 hours. Implementing the recent amendments to Regulation X took twice that amount of time, and those rules are still changing. Implementing the present rulemaking will likely require more resources than the October 2009 rulemaking but less than Regulation X.

The Board estimated the burden for the present rulemaking without addressing this evidence. The Board does not express any reason to doubt the accuracy of this evidence, nor did it counter this evidence with any information. Yet the Board arrives at an estimate that is very different from this evidence. It is true that the two rulemakings are different, but the Board does not address any of the differences.

In summary, rather than using an "objectively supported" estimate as Congress required, the Board did not take into consideration objective facts and used, instead, an estimate without basis. The Paperwork Reduction Act does not permit this.

¹¹⁸ 76 Fed. Reg. 11598, 11615 (March 2, 2011).

F. The Board Exhibits a Practice of Not Supporting Its Burden Numbers

Below is a review of the burden estimates in six recent Board rulemakings relating to consumer mortgage loans. Each shares one characteristic with the present rulemaking. That characteristic is the Board in each case estimated the initial regulatory burden under the Paperwork Reduction Act to be **exactly the same**, 40 hours, although the rules are quite different. The rules are:

1. Adding an inflation adjustment to a TILA exemption threshold, 75 Fed. Reg. 78636 (December 16, 2010).
2. An interagency risk-based pricing rule under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 2724 (January 15, 2010).
3. A loan transfer notice interim final rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 60143 (November 20, 2009).
4. An interagency rule on furnishing information to credit reporting agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 31484 (July 1, 2009).
5. A rule on disclosures under the Mortgage Disclosure Improvement Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 23289 (May 19, 2009).
6. A rule on higher-priced mortgage loans, 73 Fed. Reg. 44522 (July 30, 2008).

The Board's statements in each of these rulemakings describe what the rules require and state burden estimates, with no objective support.

In the rulemaking numbered 1 above, the Board states:

The Board estimates that the proposed rule would impose a one-time increase in the total annual burden under Regulation Z. The 1,138 respondents would take, on average, 40 hours (one business week) to update their systems to begin to comply with the requirements of Regulation Z for loans that are no longer exempt.¹¹⁹

In the rulemaking numbered 2 above, the Board states:

¹¹⁹ 75 Fed. Reg. 78636, 78642 (December 16, 2010).

Estimated Time per Response: 40 hours (one business week) to reprogram and update systems, provide employee training, and modify model notices with respondent information to comply with final requirements.¹²⁰

In the rulemaking numbered 3 above, the Board states:

The new disclosure requirement will impose a one-time increase in the total annual burden under Regulation Z for respondents supervised by the Federal Reserve that engage in mortgage acquisitions. The Board estimates that 68 respondents supervised by the Federal Reserve will take, on average, 40 hours (one business week) to update their systems, internal procedure manuals, and provide training for relevant staff to comply with the new disclosure requirements in § 226.39.¹²¹

In the rulemaking numbered 4 above, the Board states:

24 hours to implement written policies and procedures and training associated with the written policies and procedures, 8 hours to amend procedures for handling complaints received directly from consumers, 8 hours to implement the new dispute notice requirement[.] [24 + 8 + 8 = 40.]¹²²

In the rulemaking numbered 5 above, the Board states:

[T]he Board estimates that each of the 1,138 respondents supervised by the Federal Reserve System would take, on average, 40 hours (one business week) to update their systems, provide additional staff training, and update internal procedures to comply with the proposed disclosure requirements in §§ 226.17 and 226.19.¹²³

In the rulemaking numbered 6 above, the Board states:

The final rule will impose a one-time increase in the total annual burden under Regulation Z by 46,880 hours from 552,398 to 599,278 hours. This burden increase will be imposed on all [1,172] Federal Reserve-regulated institutions that are deemed to be respondents for the purposes of the PRA. [46,880 ÷ 1,172 = 40.]¹²⁴

None of these statements discuss or mention any objectively supported estimate. They merely describe the rule and conclude the initial burden is 40 hours. It appears that the Board has no support, objective or otherwise, for its estimates. It would be extraordinarily unlikely

¹²⁰ 75 Fed. Reg. 2724, 2748 (January 15, 2010).

¹²¹ 74 Fed. Reg. 60143, 60151 (November 20, 2009).

¹²² 74 Fed. Reg. 31484, 31504 (July 1, 2009).

¹²³ 74 Fed. Reg. 23289, 23298 (May 19, 2009).

¹²⁴ 73 Fed. Reg. 44222, 44595 (July 30, 2008).

coincidence for reasoned, supportable estimates of the regulatory burden imposed by seven very different rules to find exactly the same burden.

The estimates also appear highly unrealistic. The statutory definition of “burden” includes “the **total** time, effort, or financial resources expended by persons to generate, maintain, retain, or disclose or provide information to or for a Federal agency,” including a list of activities.¹²⁵ The list includes all aspects of coming into and maintaining compliance with a regulatory requirement.¹²⁶ The Board has taken the position that an inflation adjustment for a TILA exemption based on dollar amount of a loan imposes the same regulatory burden as a rule that requires a new consumer disclosure, or as its broad rule on higher-price mortgage loans. These assumptions lack a factual basis.

The Board also says in one rulemaking that an average creditor could update its systems, and do everything else necessary, in 40 hours. As has been explained to the Board in the past, this is not reasonably possible. Systems changes are far more involved than the Board acknowledges. It takes more than 40 hours just to determine what a rule requires, determine which business operations a systems change will affect, and select who to assign to the systems change project. Educating everyone involved in the project on what needs to change and what the needed result is, alone, takes hours. This is all before the systems change work even begins to be planned, designed, scheduled, installed, tested, or revised. Moreover, many creditors have more than one system impacted by a rule. Each system must be changed separately for a new rule, so multiple, independent, systems change projects are necessary.

It does not appear that the Board considered the requirements mandated by the Paperwork Reduction Act.

We propose a discussion or dialogue between the Board and mortgage creditors so that we can inform the Board about the process of complying with mortgage rules. This would enable the Board to make realistic and supported estimates of the immense regulatory burden of its rules, as the Paperwork Reduction Act requires.

G. The Proposed Disclosures Are Unnecessary

The Paperwork Reduction Act requires the Board’s rulemaking to be “necessary for the proper performance”¹²⁷ of the Board’s functions. The legislative history explains what this requires:

¹²⁵ 44 U.S.C. § 3502(2).

¹²⁶ 44 U.S.C. § 3502(2).

¹²⁷ 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(3)(A).

The [Board] is required, before approving, modifying, or denying a proposed information request, to determine whether the collection is needed for the performance of agency functions. Necessity is thus the test under this section. This determination is to include whether the collection of information:

- (1) Has practical utility for the agency,
- (2) Is not more than the minimum needed to meet the agency's objective, or
- (3) Is not duplicative of similar information otherwise accessible.¹²⁸

In its Paperwork Reduction Act discussion, the Board states "This information collection is required to provide benefits to consumers and is mandatory (15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)." This citation is to all of TILA, a lengthy statute. This sentence is a conclusion rather than an analysis. There is no determination that the proposed disclosures have practical utility. There cannot be a determination that duplicative disclosures do not exceed the minimum needed to protect consumers. There cannot be a determination that duplicative disclosures are not duplicative of other disclosures.

The Board does not cite to a particular provision in TILA that mandates the regulation. None exists. The Board fails to mention the Dodd-Frank Act's triple mandate, which prohibits this rulemaking altogether. The Board does not analyze HUD's escrow disclosures, and it does not explain why HUD's escrow disclosures are so deficient that the Board's redundant escrow disclosures are now necessary. Finally, the Board does not mention that it has had authority since 1968 to require escrow disclosures but has not done so, because the disclosures are unnecessary.

Thus, while the statute requires the Board to reduce regulatory burden by imposing it only when "necessary[,]" the Board would impose regulatory burden when unnecessary. This is not within the meaning or the spirit of the Congressional goals or the language of the Paperwork Reduction Act.

H. The Information Collection Would Increase Regulatory Burden Rather Than Reduce it as Practicable and Appropriate

The Paperwork Reduction Act requires that a collection of information "reduces to the extent practicable and appropriate the burden"¹²⁹ The proposed disclosures would increase regulatory burden without reason. As discussed above, the proposed disclosures exceed the Board's authority, and are unnecessary.

¹²⁸ S. Rep. 96-930, at 47 (1980).

¹²⁹ 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(3)(C).

Moreover, the proposed redisclosures would inappropriately increase regulatory burden by imposing a number of requirements that will be amended when RESPA and TILA rules are integrated. A final rule in the present rulemaking could be published before July 2011. Integration of RESPA and TILA rules is already in process and is a high priority for the CFPB. The CFPB could publish a proposed integrated rule soon after the designated transfer date and have a final rule a year later. That would mean the requirements of the present rulemaking would be in place for a year or less before they would need to be removed, and costly implementation of new rules would have to begin anew.

A “practicable and appropriate” approach would be for the Board to do what it announced in its February 1, 2011 announcement. That is, put an end to increasing compliance burdens through piecemeal rulemakings, and defer to the integration project because it will replace the Board’s rulemakings and forms very soon.

It is beyond the bounds of the Paperwork Reduction Act to impose a heavy regulatory burden for an unnecessary rule that will be replaced, but in the meantime, will deluge consumers with additional, redundant disclosures.

I. The Information Collection Would Duplicate Regulatory Burden Rather Than Make it Consistent and Compatible With Existing Requirements

The Paperwork Reduction Act requires the Board to impose regulatory burdens only “in ways consistent and compatible, to the maximum extent practicable, with the existing reporting and recordkeeping practices of those who are to respond[.]” Congress intended:

Each agency is to carry out its information activities in an efficient, effective, and economical manner.¹³⁰

The Board’s analysis fails to discuss any serious attempts it made to reduce burden or make its burden consistent with existing RESPA burdens. In its Paperwork Reduction Act discussion, the Board did not mention that HUD requires escrow disclosures that are substantively similar to those the Board proposes. The Board also did not note that the present rulemaking would add regulatory burden by requiring a new disclosure that mimics a disclosure *already required*.

The Board does discuss, in addressing the Regulatory Flexibility Act, how its preferred policy choice on the applicability of higher-price mortgage loans imposes less regulatory burden than its less-desired policy choice.¹³¹ The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires more than merely adopting the preferred policy choice, as we discuss below. The Paperwork Reduction Act

¹³⁰ S. Rep 96-930, at 43 (1980).

¹³¹ 76 Fed. Reg. 11598, 11618 (March 2, 2011).

requires the Board to impose burden only consistently and compatibly with existing burdens. It does not permit a collection of information that mimics and doubles existing burdens.

The Board also mentions that it proposes to permit creditors in some, but not all Regulation Z disclosures, to use “the same amounts determined for purposes of overlapping RESPA disclosure requirements.”¹³² This is not a regulatory concession to ease regulatory burden. It is the Board’s confirmation that it finds the RESPA escrow disclosures appropriate. That is, the Board’s proposed disclosures are unnecessary.

The Paperwork Reduction Act requires the Board to impose regulatory burden to be compatible with existing burdens. The Board does not mention that it could not just reduce but *eliminate* the burden of the proposed disclosures by permitting the continued use of HUD’s RESPA disclosures until the regulators integrate HUD’s and the Board’s mortgage disclosure rules and forms. This rulemaking is beyond the Paperwork Reduction Act.

J. The Board Uses an Incorrect Record Retention Requirement

The Board is required to “indicate[] for each recordkeeping requirement the length of time persons are required to maintain the records specified[.]”¹³³ The Paperwork Reduction Act broadly defines “recordkeeping requirement” to include more than what the regulation at issue requires directly, and more than the agency sponsoring a collection of information requires directly. A recordkeeping requirement is defined broadly:

[A] requirement imposed by or for an agency on persons to maintain specified records, including a requirement to:

- (A) retain such records;
- (B) notify third parties, the Federal Government, or the public of the existence of such records;
- (C) disclose such records to third parties, the Federal Government, or the public; or
- (D) report to third parties, the Federal Government, or the public regarding such records[.]¹³⁴

Congress intended record retention requirements to be subject to the clearance requirements.

¹³² 76 Fed. Reg. 11598, 11618 (March 2, 2011).

¹³³ 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(3)(F).

¹³⁴ 44 U.S.C. § 3502(13).

The term ‘collection of information’ replaces the term ‘information’ in the original Federal Reports Act, (44 U.S.C. § 3502). The substantive meaning of the original definition is retained but two specific clarifications are made. First, recordkeeping requirements, which are also defined in section 3502, are explicitly included as means of soliciting facts or opinions by an agency. Information maintained, as opposed to directly provided by federal agencies, is therefore subject to the clearance requirements for collections of information set forth in section 3507.¹³⁵

In the present rulemaking, the Board states:

Creditors are required to retain evidence of compliance for twenty-four months, § 226.25, but **Regulation Z** identifies only a few specific types of records that must be retained.¹³⁶

We note that the supporting statement for another Regulation Z rulemaking states very similarly:

Creditors must keep evidence of compliance for twenty-four months. . . . No paperwork burden is deemed to be associated with the recordkeeping requirement of **Regulation Z** (subpart D, section 226.25) because **the regulation** does not specify records to be retained as evidence of compliance.¹³⁷

This analysis is incomplete. The Paperwork Reduction Analysis is not limited to either:

- The records **Regulation Z** or the **Board** require persons to retain; or
- The length of time **Regulation Z** or the **Board** require persons to maintain records.

A “collection of information” includes record retention requirements more broadly than the Board mentions. A collection of information includes:

[R]equiring the disclosure to . . . third parties or the public of information by or for an agency **by means of** identical questions posed to, or identical reporting, **recordkeeping, or disclosure requirements** imposed on, ten or more persons, whether such collection of information is mandatory, voluntary, or required to obtain or retain a benefit.¹³⁸ . . .

¹³⁵ S. Rep. 96-930, at 36 (1980).

¹³⁶ 76 Fed. Reg. 11598, 11615 (March 2, 2011) (emphasis added).

¹³⁷ Emphasis added. Available here (see p. 11):
http://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/formsreview/RegZ_20110209_omb.pdf

¹³⁸ 5 C.F.R. § 1320.3(c) (emphasis added).

A ‘collection of information’ may be in any form or format, including the use of report forms; application forms; schedules; questionnaires; surveys; **reporting or recordkeeping requirements**¹³⁹

This definition is not limited to the requirements of the collection of information immediately at issue. It can include requirements that are indirectly triggered by the first collection of information.

‘Collection of information’ includes **any** requirement or request for persons to obtain, maintain, retain, report, or publicly disclose information.¹⁴⁰ . . .

A ‘collection of information’ may implicitly or explicitly include **related** collection of information requirements.¹⁴¹

The Board’s analysis of the recordkeeping requirement needs to reflect the fact that the government sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the GSEs) require their sellers and servicers to retain a large number of records, including Regulation Z disclosures, for longer than two years. Freddie Mac requires servicers to retain all loan records for seven years after Freddie Mac has any interest in the loan, while Fannie Mae requires retention of all records for four years after the loan is liquidated, and in some circumstances longer.¹⁴²

When Regulation Z requires production of a document in connection with a consumer mortgage loan, the creditor or servicer often must retain it for the GSE-specified period, regardless of whether Regulation Z requires its retention at all, or for how long Regulation Z requires its retention. A valid Paperwork Reduction Act analysis must consider the actual recordkeeping requirements that an industry will bear as a direct and immediate result of a collection of information.

¹³⁹ 5 C.F.R. § 1320.3(c)(1) (emphasis added).

¹⁴⁰ 5 C.F.R. § 1320.3(c).

¹⁴¹ 5 C.F.R. § 1320.3(c)(1) (emphasis added).

¹⁴² Fannie Mae’s requirement is: “After a mortgage is liquidated, the servicer must keep the individual mortgage records for at least four years (measured from the date of payoff or the date that any applicable claim proceeds are received), unless the local jurisdiction requires longer retention or we specify that we want the records retained for a longer period.” Fannie Mae 2006 Servicing Guide I, 405, Record Retention (1/31/03). Freddie Mac’s requirement is: “The Servicer must maintain the Mortgage file while Freddie Mac retains an interest in the applicable Mortgage and for at least seven years from the date Freddie Mac’s interest in the Mortgage is satisfied.” Freddie Mac Single-Family Seller/Servicer Guide Vol. 2, 52.3, Maintenance (10/1/09). The guides are available online. Fannie Mae’s is at <https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/?from=hp> and Freddie Mac’s is at <http://www.freddie.com/sell/guide/>

The Board appears to read the Paperwork Reduction Act to require the Board's certification to indicate:

[A] **This** requirement imposed by or for ~~an~~ **this** agency on persons to maintain specified records, including a requirement **in the same regulation or requirement by this agency** to . . . retain such records[.]”

There is no basis for this reading, as it would require changing language Congress enacted. The statute is not limited to one agency's requirements. Congress intended to define recordkeeping requirement broadly. It is not limited to the collection of information of the agency directly at issue:

The term ‘recordkeeping requirement’ means a requirement imposed by an agency on persons to maintain specified information. The definition includes information maintained by persons which may be but is not necessarily provided to a federal agency.¹⁴³

This makes clear that a collection of information is not limited to recordkeeping requirements expressly imposed by that same collection of information or by the same agency that sponsors the collection of information. The Board's reading of the statute would require ignoring the definition of agency in the Paperwork Reduction Act, which is very broad:

[A]ny executive department, military department, Government corporation, [and] **Government controlled corporation**[.]¹⁴⁴

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are Government controlled corporations. They are operated at the sole direction of their conservator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, they are 80 percent owned by the Treasury Department, and, were it not for massive Federal funding, they would be unable to operate.

Further, OMB's regulation defines the sponsor of a collection of information broadly, and without limitation to a single agency:

A Federal agency [meaning **any** Federal agency] is considered to “conduct or sponsor” a collection of information if the agency collects the information, causes another agency to collect the information, contracts or enters into a cooperative agreement with a person to collect the information, or requires a person to provide information to another person, or in similar ways causes another agency, contractor, partner in a cooperative agreement, or

¹⁴³ S. Rep. 96-930, at 38 (1980).

¹⁴⁴ 44 U.S.C. § 3502(1) (emphasis added).

person to obtain, solicit, or require the disclosure to third parties or the public of information by or for an agency.¹⁴⁵

We believe the Board needs to address the burdens its regulation would necessarily impose beyond the narrow, hypertechnical confines of Regulation Z. We also believe the Board should consider the definition of agency in connection with this collection of information. Finally, we believe the Board should address whether the GSEs are agencies for purposes of the Board's record retention analysis.

This letter does not take the position that the GSEs should be defined as agencies under the Paperwork Reduction Act. It simply points out what a plain reading of the statute reveals. The legislative history appears to have intended to define the term agency broadly. Congress did consider the term:

In the discussion of specific issues the Committee reaffirms the existing interpretation of the Brooks Act as it applies to government contractors by citing a legal memorandum from the Department of Justice to the General Counsel of the General Services Administration. The explicit exclusion of government-owned, contractor-operated facilities from the term agency is not intended to alter the status of that legal opinion as a correct statement of the law as it applies to 'government contractors' in general. The Committee believes that the memorandum accurately describes the law and intends no change in the law.¹⁴⁶

The Senate Report quotes the referenced legal opinion. The opinion clarifies that the definition of agency is quite broad:

The term 'federal agency' as used in the Brooks Act is defined in the Federal Property Act, 40 U.S.C. § 472(b). It means 'any executive agency or any establishment in the legislative or judicial branch of the government (except the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the Architect of the Capitol and any activities under his direction.'¹⁴⁷

The Board has apparently misapplied the record retention provision. We believe this is another reason the Board's burden estimate is unsupported and is unrealistically low.

If the Board requires additional information on GSE record retention requirements, we would be pleased to add that topic to our discussion or dialogue about regulatory burden.

¹⁴⁵ 5 C.F.R. § 1320.3(d).

¹⁴⁶ S. Rep. 96-930, at 36 (1980).

¹⁴⁷ S. Rep. 96-930, at 30 (1980).

K. The Board Does Not Use the Information Efficiently to Enhance Its Utility To Consumers

The Paperwork Reduction Act Requires the Board to “plan[] and allocate[] resources for the efficient and effective management and use of the information to be collected, including the processing of the information in a manner which shall enhance, where appropriate, the utility of the information to agencies and the public[.]”¹⁴⁸ It also requires the Board to “maximize the practical utility of and public benefit from information collected by or for the Federal Government.”¹⁴⁹

The need for practical utility is not limited to information a federal agency collects. It applies to collections of information that result in disclosures to third parties even if the agency never sees the information. This is clear from the fact that in 1995 Congress removed the words “it collects” from the definition of practical utility in what is now designated as 44 U.S.C. § 3502(11), as follows:

(11) the term ‘practical utility’ means the ability of an agency to use information ~~it collects~~, particularly the capability to process such information in a timely and useful fashion[.]

This collection of information would impose regulatory burden for the purpose of providing redundant disclosures to consumers that they do not want or need, and that contribute to the information overload problem that Congress intended to terminate.

The proposed disclosures are contrary to the Paperwork Reduction Act.

L. Request for Opportunity for Interested Parties to be Heard and to Submit Written Statements

One of the Paperwork Reduction Act procedures is the following:

Before making a determination [to approve or disapprove an information collection] the [Board] may give the agency and other interested persons an opportunity to be heard or to submit statements in writing.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(3)(H).

¹⁴⁹ 44 U.S.C. § 3504(c)(4).

¹⁵⁰ 44 U.S.C. § 3508 (emphasis added).

As demonstrated above, the Paperwork Reduction Act requirements have not been met for this rulemaking. The rule cannot be enforceable until the Board complies with all applicable requirements. The mortgage industry does not want to incur the costs of implementing a rule that will not be enforced.

The Paperwork Reduction Act issues that this rulemaking raises are significant, and we believe they have not been sufficiently debated by the many interested parties, including, but not limited to, the GSEs and the Federal Housing Finance Agency.

For these reasons, we respectfully request that, if the Board does not withdraw this collection of information, interested parties have an opportunity, under section 3508 of the Paperwork Reduction Act, to both:

- Be heard in oral argument on the Paperwork Reduction Act issues in the present collection of information; and
- Present statements in writing on the Paperwork Reduction Act issues in the present collection of information.

We urge the Board, if it does continue with this collection of information, after receiving additional arguments and views on the Paperwork Reduction Act, to amend its Paperwork Reduction Act analysis in response to those arguments and views, and in compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act. The Board then would need to publish its revised analysis for public comment as required by 44 U.S.C. § 3406(c)(2) and for [Board] comment as required by § 3507(d)(1)(B).

Given that it is not possible for the Board to comply with the Paperwork Reduction Act in this collection of information before the designated transfer date, we urge the Board in the alternative to simply withdraw the provisions of this collection of information that would be burdensome to implement, including all proposed disclosures and requiring implementation of the new definition of transaction coverage rate.

II. The Board Has Not Complied With the Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires the Board's Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) to do the following:

- “[D]escribe the impact of the proposed rule on small entities.”¹⁵¹

¹⁵¹ 5 U.S.C. § 603(a).

- “[W]here feasible, [include] an estimate of the number of small entities to which the proposed rule will apply[.]”¹⁵²
- Describe “the type of professional skills necessary for preparation of the report or record[.]”¹⁵³
- Identify “all relevant Federal rules which may duplicate, overlap or conflict with the proposed rule.”¹⁵⁴

Most importantly, the Regulatory Flexibility Act requires:

Each initial regulatory flexibility analysis shall also contain a description of any significant alternatives to the proposed rule which accomplish the stated objectives of applicable statutes and which minimize any significant economic impact of the proposed rule on small entities. Consistent with the stated objectives of applicable statutes, the analysis shall discuss significant alternatives such as . . . the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for such small entities[.]¹⁵⁵

A. The Board Does Not Describe the Impact of Its Proposed Rule on Small Entities

The Board does not describe the impact of the proposed rule on small entities. It simply describes what the rule would require small entities to do, and states “The effect of the proposed revisions to Regulation Z on small entities is unknown.”

The Board apparently made no effort to determine the impact. This is insufficient. The Board could have simply asked small entities what the impact might be. The Board could have drawn on the expertise of the Small Business Administration to help estimate the impact. The IRFA should address, or at least acknowledge, unrefuted evidence, quoted earlier in this letter, that implementing a different Regulation Z rulemaking took tens of thousands of hours at one creditor.

B. The Board Fails to Estimate the Impact on Small Entities Despite Readily Available, Reliable Information

¹⁵² 5 U.S.C. § 603(b)(3).

¹⁵³ 5 U.S.C. § 603(b)(4).

¹⁵⁴ 5 U.S.C. § 603(b)(5).

¹⁵⁵ 5 U.S.C. § 603(c) and (c)(2).

The Board similarly makes no real attempt to estimate the number of small entities to which the proposed rule would apply. The Board states:

The Board is not aware of a reliable source for the total number of small entities likely to be affected by the proposal, and the credit provisions of TILA and Regulation Z have broad applicability to individuals and businesses that originate, extend, and service even small numbers of home-secured credit. . . . Certain parts of the proposed rule would also apply to mortgage servicers. The Board is not aware, however, of a source of data for the number of small mortgage servicers.¹⁵⁶

There is a ready and very reliable source of the information the Board lacks. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac know all or almost all consumer mortgage lenders and servicers nationwide. The Federal Housing Finance Agency and the GSEs together could readily obtain a highly accurate count for the Board's IRFA.

C. The Board Fails to Describe the Professional Skills Necessary to Comply With the Proposed Rule

The Board is required to describe the type of professional skills necessary for complying with the proposed rule. The Board appears not to have attempted to comply with this statutory requirement.

The Board must know through its supervision and examination of banking organizations the types of skills those organizations use. The Board could readily obtain the latest examination trends, information, and expertise through the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, of which the Board is a member.

D. The Board Fails to Identify Conflicting Statutory Provisions, and Fails to Mention That Its Proposed Rule is Highly Duplicative of Existing Disclosures

The Board is also required to identify all relevant Federal rules that may duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the proposed rule. The Board states:

¹⁵⁶ 76 Fed. Reg. 11598, 11616-17 (March 2, 2011).

The Board has not identified any Federal rules that conflict with the proposed revisions to Regulation Z.¹⁵⁷

We have identified three conflicting laws earlier in this letter. They are each of the three mandates in what this letter terms the triple Congressional mandate to integrate RESPA and TILA rules. This proposed rule conflicts with all three.

The Board does not mention any rules that duplicate the proposed rule. This letter has identified several RESPA rules that require disclosures relating to escrow accounts. The proposed disclosures are extremely duplicative of several existing RESPA disclosures. The Board does acknowledge that its proposed disclosures “overlap” RESPA disclosures. This does not acknowledge that the proposed disclosures are highly duplicative of the RESPA disclosures.

The Board’s IRFA does mention that RESPA escrow rules require periodic escrow analyses and delivery of escrow account statements that the proposed rule does *not* duplicate. It is true that the Board’s proposed rule does not duplicate every RESPA rule. However, the IRFA is required to identify the rules that *are* duplicative, not the rules that are not.

The Regulatory Flexibility Act is designed to prevent conflicting and duplicative rules. The Board’s failure to acknowledge that its proposed rule would conflict with the triple statutory mandate, and that it would duplicate RESPA disclosures, does not comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act. This lack of compliance is significant because it goes to the purpose underlying the Regulatory Flexibility Act, namely regulatory flexibility. By not acknowledging that the burden of the proposed disclosures is unnecessary and redundant, the Board does not consider significant regulatory alternatives to the proposed disclosures.

E. The Board Does Not Comply with a Central Mandate of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the Requirement to Consider Regulatory Flexibility

One of the most important requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act is that the agency consider “**any significant alternatives to the proposed rule** which accomplish the stated objectives of applicable statutes and which minimize any significant economic impact of the proposed rule on small entities[.]”¹⁵⁸

In its IRFA, the Board has not identified a single alternative to the proposed disclosures. The IRFA does describe how the Board’s preferred proposed rule may impose less regulatory burden on small entities than alternatives that the Board did not consider. That approach is not what is

¹⁵⁷ 76 Fed. Reg. 11598, 11617 (March 2, 2011).

¹⁵⁸ 5 U.S.C. § 603(c).

required in an IRFA. The IRFA must describe **alternatives** to the proposed rule, not why the proposed rule will not be burdensome. We suggest some very reasonable alternatives that an IRFA in this rulemaking is incomplete without:

- Do not require duplicative disclosures. There is no reason for them. Instead, permit creditors to provide the escrow disclosures that RESPA rules require, until the disclosures are integrated.
- Work towards integrating RESPA and TILA rules rather than working in the opposite direction.
- Avoid requiring small entities to come into compliance with a hugely burdensome rule that will be revised in the very near future.

Each of these reasonable alternatives would very substantially avoid unnecessary regulatory burden on small entities. Any valid IRFA must acknowledge the existence of, and address, each of these reasonable alternatives.

III. The Board Should Compare the Costs to the Benefits of its Regulation

Cost-benefit analyses of rulemakings are an exercise in good government practices. They can avoid ill-advised or inappropriate rulemakings.

In the present rulemaking, the Board mentions no comparison of the costs of the rule to its benefits. OMB stated in its 2010 report to Congress:

Table 1-7 lists each of these rules and the extent to which GAO reported benefit and cost estimates for the rule. Of the 11 rules that were issued to regulate the financial sector, only one rule provided complete monetized benefit and cost information: the SEC's final rule on Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option for Registered Open-End Management Investment Companies. The SEC conducts some benefit-cost analysis of its rules, but it generally does not quantify and monetize benefits and costs. The Federal Reserve System promulgated five rules: three final rules and two interim final rules. The agency did not, however, prepare benefit-cost analyses to assess the effects of the rules.¹⁵⁹

Cost benefit analyses improve the quality of any rulemaking. They can avoid wasteful rulemakings such as much of the present one. We would be more than happy to provide data and input and to otherwise assist the Board in performing and supporting such an analysis.

¹⁵⁹ The Report is at this link, and Table 1-7 is on page 28.